

THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA
ETHIOPIA FOREST DEVELOPMENT (EFD)



OROMIA ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AUTHORITY (OEPA)

**OROMIA FORESTED LANDSCAPE PROGRAM-EMISSION REDUCTION
PROJECT (OFLP-ERP)
(P151294)**

SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT PLAN

August 2022

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

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List of Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project)
BSP	Benefit Sharing Plan
CRGE	Climate Resilient Green Economy
EFD	Ethiopian forest development
EHRC	Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
ERP	Emission Reduction Program
ERPA	Emission Reductions Payment Agreement
ESF	Environmental and Social Framework
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
GRC	Grievance Redressing Committee
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP)
ISFL	Initiative for Sustainable Forested Landscape
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NDF	National Defense Force
OEPA	Oromia Environment Protection authority
OFLP	Oromia Forested Landscape Program
OFWE	Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise
OLA/Shene	Oromo Liberation Army
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
ORCU	Oromia REDD+ Coordination Unit
ORS	Oromia Regional State
PFM	Participatory forest management
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
SMP	Security Management Plan
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
USDoS	United States Department of State

Executive summary

Ethiopia's largest forested landscapes are found in Oromia National Regional State which provides critical ecosystem services to the country and the region. Oromia Forested Landscape Program (OFLP) Emission Reduction Program (ERP) is expected to provide financial incentives to support sustainable forest management, conservation, restoration and investment, which, in turn, enhance environmental, social and economic benefits in Oromia National Regional State (ORS). The program helps Ethiopia to achieve its national ambition for green growth, as articulated in Second Growth and Transformation Plan.

The program development objective (PDO) is to “incentivize the generation of measured, reported and verified Emissions Reductions Credits (ERCs) from reduced deforestation, forest degradation, enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+), Agriculture and other Land Use Sectors in Oromia Regional State and to distribute payments resulting of the purchase of those ERCs in accordance with an agreed benefit sharing plan.” The program has two main components; Component one: Purchase of Emission Reduction and distribution following the Benefit Sharing Plan, and Component two: comprehensive Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) system and program management including Safeguards Management system. The second component is providing financing for enabling environment activities.

The OFLP-ERP implementation arrangements include relevant institutions at the national, state, and sub-state levels; The Ministry of Finance (MoF) at federal level will sign the Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA) and take the overall fiduciary responsibility, while Ethiopian forest development (EFD) will oversees the overall technical and policy dimensions of the program at Federal level. Oromia REDD+ Coordination Unit (ORCU) of Oromia Environment Protection Authority (OEPA) is implementing entity of OFLP-ER program which manages program's the day to day activities.

Currently forests in Oromia are threatened by deforestation and forest degradation practices. Despite presence of World Bank financed forest management-oriented program interventions in the region, there are still considerable Environment and Social impact risks related to implementation of proposed OFLP-ER program.

Moreover, existing fragility and ethnic conflict situations in the country, as well as on-going instabilities in parts of Oromia region, such as in Eastern and western Wollega zone, Borena and Guji have aggravated the situation and may hinder access to some program Worredas, hence adversely impact implementation of OFLP-ER Program activities, all these necessitate the current security risk assessment (SRA) and security management plan preparation (SMP).

Security Risk assessment Scope and Methodology

The primary objective of the security risk assessment is to identify the main security risks existed in program implementation areas and their impacts on program implementation process as well

as on program implementing parties. The assessment was undertaken in Oromia Region, with special emphasis on zones and woredas particularly selected as insecurity prone.

The implemented risk assessment methodology composes both primary and secondary methods of data collection. Field based data collection activity is conducted in selected ten program implementation woredas which spread-out over five administrative zones, (Bunu-Bedele zone, Jimma zone, East-Wollega zone, west-guji zone and South-West Shoa Zone of Oromia region). Upon data collection activities, 14 focus group discussions (FGDs) are conducted with program beneficiaries, while the study team has also conducted 16 Key-informant interviews (KIIs) with relevant woreda sector bureau officials within a period between; June 8 to June 25, 2022.

Major findings of the Security Risk Assessment

The Identification of potential program security risks could involve activities ranging from a relatively straightforward screening of risks to broader undertakings of more formal and comprehensive security risk assessment analysis. In current security risk assessment, the study team has identified both potential contextual security risk factors and OFLP-ER program induced security risks. The assessment identified the following five contextual risk Factors; [a. Territorial and Village-border Conflicts, b. Wildfire related security risks, c. Historically/Politically rooted Inter-ethnic conflicts, d. Cattle raiding-leading to conflict and e. Encampment of armed groups in the forests] as a major challenges of human security pertaining to program implantation areas.

On other hand, the list of identified program induced security risks includes; [a. Common security risks like petty theft, b. Program land demarcation induced disputes/conflicts, c. Conflict between local villagers and forest management cooperatives, d. Program Service-induced conflicts, e. Attacks from Wild animals, f. Road safety/transport related human safety risks, g. Workplace accidents/safety risks, h. Risks from engagement of security personnel, i. Program activity induced GBV risks and j. Risks related to armed conflict].

For of the above identified actual and potential security risks, the study team has also performs security risk classification and analysis. Generally the overall OFLP-ER program is assessed as a substantial security risk program, while the program security risk analysis identified twelve (12) key security risks in program regions, having a distribution of; two critical risks, three High risks, six medium risks, one low risks, and no negligible /very low risks.

Finally program security management plan (SMP) document is prepared. The document defines the content and structure of OFLP-ER program security management plan. It also address the requirements for staff, operation processes, documentation and physical facilities needed to meet specific physical and personnel security, security-management governance and Grievance redressing mechanism (GRM) assurance requirements of the World Bank.

Section One: Introduction

1.1 Background to the Program

The Climate Resilient Green Economy and the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of Ethiopia aims at achieving a middle-income country status by 2025 while maintaining the 2010 GHG emissions level which would double from 150 to 400 Mt CO₂ under the business-as-usual scenario. Oromia Forested Landscape Program (OFLP) Emission Reduction Program-phase (ERP) is expected to provide financial incentives to support sustainable forest management, conservation, restoration and investment as it pays for Emission Reduction results generated across Oromia region.

Program's Emission Reduction (ER) vision aims to contribute to the realization of the regional and national goals of the Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy (CRGE), subsequent phases of the GTP-2, the National REDD+ Strategy and the sector strategies for forest, agriculture (livestock and crop) and renewable energy. The long-term program will contribute to a transformation in how forested landscapes are managed in Oromia to deliver multiple benefits such as poverty reduction and resilient livelihoods, climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation, and water provisioning.

Ethiopia's largest forested landscapes are found in Oromia National Regional State which provides critical ecosystem services to the country and the region. Most of Oromia's high forest is found in Bale landscape in southeast and the Jimma/Illubabor landscape in southwest and Wollega landscape in the west. OFLP-ER operates at jurisdictional landscape scale. The program seeks promoting climate-smart agricultural and low-carbon land-use practices that have significant impact and transform rural areas by protecting forests, restoring degraded lands, enhancing agricultural productivity, by improving livelihoods and local environments. OFLP-ER is designed in a way it to leverages initiative for Sustainable Forested Landscape (ISFL) grants to attract new financing, expanding the total envelope toward improved land use system, forest retention, and forest gains to serve as "scale-up engine."

However, currently forests in Oromia are threatened by deforestation and forest degradation practices. Reports from Oromia regional state (ORS) indicate the presence of high Deforestation in some areas, particularly intense in the west (West Wollega, Qeleme Wollega, and Ilu Aba Bora), eastern Wollega and east (Bale and Guji) zones. Main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation includes agriculture land expansion, fuelwood extraction, forest coffee plantation and management, unsustainable logging and overgrazing, high demand for forest products, lack of livestock value chain improvement, poor livestock management and weak extension services. Oromia region is performing various integrated forest and natural resource management program interventions to address the above deforestation drivers, yet still gaps are observed in satisfactory achievements.

Despite presence of ongoing, World-Bank financed forest management oriented program interventions in the region, there are still considerable Environment and Social impact risks

related to implementation of proposed OFLP-ER program. Moreover, on-going fragility and ethnic conflict situations in the country, such as conflict in the North, North-East and South-West Ethiopia and particularly instability in parts of Oromia region, such as in Eastern and western Wollega zone, Borena and Guji have aggravated the situation and may hinder access to some Worredas or adversely impact implementation and monitoring of the OFLP-ER Program activities, E&S risk management. All these necessitate the current security risk assessment (SRA) and security management plan preparation (SMP).

1.2 Program Description

The Emission Reduction program operation is part of the broader Oromia Forested Landscape Program (OFLP) which aims to use carbon finance to promote smarter and more integrated land use practices to minimize forest loss and greenhouse gas emission in the Oromia Regional State. The OFLP will foster equitable and sustainable low carbon development through a series of: (a) on-the-ground activities that address deforestation, reduce land-use-based emissions, and enhance forest carbon stocks (enabling investments); and (b) statewide and local enhancements to institutions, policies, information, and safeguards management to scale up investment (enabling environment).

Oromia Forested Landscape Program (OFLP) Emission Reduction Program (ERP) will pay for ER results generated across Oromia. Thus, the program is expected to provide financial incentives to support sustainable forest management, conservation, restoration and investment, which, in turn, enhance environmental, social and economic benefits in Oromia National Regional State (ORS). The program helps Ethiopia to achieve its national ambition for green growth, as articulated in the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-2), the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) Strategy and the recent Ten-Year Perspective Development Plan by ensuring readiness to utilize financing related to REDD+.

The program is also aiming to strategically support the FDRE to mobilize, coordinate, and scale up funding from diverse sources. By supports from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and Bio Carbon Fund of the World Bank, Ethiopia has been implementing the REDD+ program and currently entering into the Emissions Reduction Program phase.

According to the updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) (NDC, 2021) the Land Use Change and Forestry (LUCF) sectors, with the REDD+ as its principal mitigation lever is expected to yield a huge Emission Reduction (ER) abatement potential of (48.4130 MtCO₂e (unconditional-unpaid) and 240.1MtCO₂e (if conditional- means the external support or paid) out of the total 56.4 MtCO₂e ER of all sectors (unconditional) and 277.7 MtCO₂e (conditional- if paid) expected reduction by 2030.

The principle of the Program is that activities related to (i) enabling investment (forest and landscape management, including soil management and livestock management), (ii) enabling environment (policies, extension services) as well as (iii) Program operating environment

((Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) system, Program coordination, Environmental and Social compliance system)) lead to Emission Reductions (ERs) over the jurisdiction. Those ERs will be periodically measured and reported by GoE according to the ISFL methodological framework, independently verified and then issued as ISFL ERC. The purchase of those ERCs through an Emission Reduction Payment Agreement (ERPA) will be distributed on the basis of a pre-agreed Benefit Sharing Plan (BSP).

While resources for the initial investments are provided by a set of programs, it is expected that a large portion of payments through the BSP will also help sustain the generation of ERs throughout the lifetime of the Program and even after. The rest of the payments will be used for Social Development and for the benefits of vulnerable and underserved communities.

The figures below summarize the principles of the program.




Fig 1.1: Overview of the Program

1.3 The Emission reductions are generated by underlying investments and policies behind the program scope. **The program development objectives (PDO)**

PDO is to “incentivize the generation of measured, reported and verified Emissions Reductions Credits (ERCs) from reduced deforestation, forest degradation, enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+), Agriculture and other Land Use Sectors that meet the GHG accounting requirements of the BioCF ISFL in the Oromia Regional State and to distribute payments resulting of the purchase of those ERCs in accordance with an agreed benefit sharing plan.”

Program Beneficiaries:

In line with the REDD+ jurisdictional approach that defines the carbon accounting area, the OFLP will cover all of Oromia’s rural woredas. In these woredas there are approximately 1.8 million people living inside or immediately adjacent to existing forests. ER payments will directly benefit communities and the government according to the rules set out in the current advanced draft Benefit Sharing Plan (BSP): 75% for community development activities, 20% to the government, 5% for activities supporting private sector development.

Beneficiaries of the ERC payment through the Benefit sharing Plan: The direct beneficiaries are smallholders and communities who will benefit from capacity building and the development/social projects to be implemented using the ER payment to be received as a result of verified emission reduction and distributed based on the BSP. Key stakeholders of the ER Program include: (a) forest dependent communities, and forest resource users, farmers, herders, and cooperatives; (b) federal institutions such as the EFD, MoF, MoA, and Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Authority (EWCA); (c) Oromia National Regional State sector institutions such as the Vice President Office for Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster, BoF, OEPA, OFWE, BoA, Oromia Cooperative Promotion and Development Bureau, BoWERD, BoL, local government sector institution at zone and woreda levels, and other public institutions that will directly or indirectly involve in the implementation of the ER Program and/or benefit from ER proceeds; (d) community-based organizations (CBOs such as Forest Management Cooperatives-FMC) and NGOs who provide support to communities and to government agencies; and (e) the private sector entities involved in the ER Program.

ER payments will promote sustainable land-use practices that will benefit all communities in these areas. In addition, 45% of the BSP payments for the community development activities will be reserved for livelihood development and social activities. Thus, a large subset of Oromia’s rural population is expected to benefit from the activities generated by the ER payments. The exact number of direct beneficiaries of ER payments will be evaluated ex post, once the BSP is implemented. Moreover, these benefits will only materialize when emissions from the program area are reduced.

Beneficiaries of the grant portions: the grants will be dedicated to the improvement and the operationalization of the MRV, Safeguards management system established for the program and for the program management, M&E and communication. Thus, the grants are mostly expected to build the country’s institutional capacities within the technical ministries and agencies such as

MoA, National REDD Secretariat (NRS) and EFD at federal level; OEPA-ORCU, OBoA, OBWERD, BoL and OFWE at regional level.

Engagement with civil society: Partners such as NGOs are also working with relevant bureaus/authority/agencies to: (a) prepare, implement, and report on ER activities through joint annual OFLP work plans using the coordination platforms; (b) ensure consistent application of E&S safeguard rules including application of FGRM; (c) maintains application of standard and agreed upon MRV and BSP systems throughout and (b) ensure synergies between existing sector initiatives that affect OFLP objectives.

Engagement with the private sector: Similarly, private sector businesses implementing or investing in forested landscape friendly initiatives will coordinate their work with OFLP-ERP. Such private sector entities include, those involved in commercial forest development activities; wood processing industries (small, medium and large); entities investing in commercial coffee plantations and processing (financed by DPs and other locally based firms); commercial agricultural firms including cattle husbandry (for milk and beef); commercial honey harvesters and processors; commercial gum, spice other forest product collectors and processors; improved cook stove and biogas producers and distributors. All these are located in zones and woredas of Oromia and fall in different clusters as identified by OFLP. Coordination of activities at local level will be extended to these private entities too in order these entities' commercial activities bring in sustainability, where feasible, contributing to more ER at landscape level.

1.4 Program Components

The program is envisioned to have two main components; a cross-cutting component on gender and citizen engagement will be implemented in parallel to ensure equal participation from men and women in the forest sector. A brief summary of the program components is provided below:

Component 1: Purchase of Emission Reduction and distribution following the Benefit Sharing Plan (ERPA): US\$60 million; committed: \$10m, initial financing gap: \$50m). This component includes the purchase of the ERCs coming from the sound management of landscape as well as the distribution of the net revenues according to the Benefit sharing plan (BSP).

Sub-component 1.1: Payment for Emission Reduction Credits

This sub-component represents the payments for up to US\$60 million (including options and future phases) for verified carbon performance paid within a period of up to December 31, 2029. These payments will be available once the program achieves, verifies, and reports on results with regard to reduced emissions. This climate financing will be channeled through an ERPA to be signed between the FDRE and the Bank.

Given the uncertainty related to the implementation of the underlying activities, ER purchase has been set with two modalities: (i) contract ERs (about \$40m), which represents the value of ERC that the Bank as a trustee and implementing agency of the ISFL, will commit to purchase if they

are produced from the jurisdiction of Oromia in multiple phases. As per the ERPA, the government may still decide to keep the ERCs or sell them to another buyer for a higher price; (ii) option ERs (about \$20m), which represents ERCs that the Bank may decide to purchase, at its own discretion, if there are ERCs generated beyond the contract ERs.

Sub-component 1.2: Distribution of ER payments as per a BSP

The BSP was prepared through a highly participatory process. The BSP provides an operational solution for disbursing the performance-based ER payments equitably, effectively, and efficiently. It is guided by these principles (I.e., equity, efficiency and transparency), and defines the subcategories of beneficiaries, monitoring provisions, as well as the processes for the distribution of benefits (eligibility criteria, allocation procedures, and flow of funds). It was designed by the FDRE during early OFLP Grant implementation period through a robust consultation process held statewide including with potential community beneficiaries.

Component 2: Comprehensive Measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) system and program management including Safeguards Management system

This component is expected to provide financing for specific enabling environment activities such as (i) the finalization of the MRV system development, capacity building training on ER monitoring for the livestock sector and (ii) the operating cost related to the program management until the government receives the 1st ERC payment. Those activities can be financed by dedicated grants as well as, in the future, a contribution from the ERC payments.

Sub-component 2.1: Program Management including Safeguards and communication

This subcomponent will support operation of the Oromia REDD+ coordination unit and equipment. These costs include: the time of ORCU staff (program coordinator, safeguards specialists, MRV specialists), equipment related with the OFLP execution, operational costs for the coordination unit (Safeguards supervision, field missions, MRV activity monitoring...), as well as any other operating cost as deemed necessary for the successful implementation of the program – including institutional capacity strengthening of the program implementing structures.

This subcomponent will also finance the expenses related to program Monitoring and evaluation (M&E), communication and knowledge management including: (a) meetings of the review/piloting committees; (b) implementation of the M&E framework; (c) communication and knowledge sharing; (d) planning and dissemination workshops; (e) impact assessment, midterm review, and completion evaluations.

Sub-component 2.2: Improvement of the Comprehensive Measurement, Reporting and Verification system:

As mentioned above, in order to generate ERCs, there should be an agreed baseline for each *eligible subcategory* (ISFL requirements) as well as a system to collect and measure the actual emissions.

1.5 Implementation arrangement and key program stakeholders

1.5.1 Federal and Regional Level Institutional Arrangements

The OFLP-ERP implementation arrangements include relevant institutions at the national, state, and sub-state levels; The Ministry of Finance (MoF) at federal level will sign the ERPA and take the overall fiduciary responsibility. MoF will receive funds from the ERC purchase based on verified ER amount achieved by the Program at the end of each ERPA phase and distribute ER benefits according to the BSP.


Ethiopian forest development (EFD) will oversee the overall technical and policy dimensions of the program at Federal level, while Oromia Environment Protection Authority (OEPA) will have the oversight responsibility for the OFLP-ER program in subsequent phases in Oromia regional state jurisdiction. OEPA was set up by Proclamation 199/2016 (amended recently by regional regulation no. 242/2021) and is officially mandated to oversee the forest sector in Oromia.

The Oromia REDD+ Coordination Unit (ORCU) of OEPA is implementing OFLP-ER program, While ORCU reports administratively to the OEPA, it seeks strategic and tactical guidance from the Oromia Regional State Vice President, given the multi-sector nature of OFLP. In order to achieve expected results in terms of Emission Reduction and landscape management, OFLP acts as the programmatic umbrella coordinating activities and partnering with multiple programs for a multi-sector, multi-partner integrated management of Oromia's landscapes.

The Oromia REDD+ Coordination Unit (ORCU) within Oromia Environment Protection Authority (OEPA) is acting as a Program coordination unit tasked with the Program day-to-day technical and administrative management including ER monitoring, reporting and Safeguard supervision activities. It also coordinates with regional government line institutions, agriculture and forest-based unions, the private sectors, and civil societies.

In this regard, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed with six regional entities including OEPA, Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise (OFWE), Bureau of Agriculture and Natural Resource (BoANR), now named as Bureau of Agriculture (BoA), Livestock and Fisheries Resource Development Agency (LFRDA), Bureau of Rural Land administration and Use (BoLAU), now named Bureau of Land (BoL), This institutional set up will continue during the current OFLP ER program implementation.

Fig.1.2 Institutional Arrangements for Program implementation



1.5.2 ER-Program segment activities implementation arrangement

Moreover, program implementation is also separated in to following activities, following the various program-activity segments:

The underlying activities are coordinated by ORCU but executed by various programs and programs. The regional state's multi-sector REDD+ Steering Committee and Technical Working Group which was established during grant implementation will continue providing strategic guidance and technical inputs, respectively. The OEPA and sector bureaus including the Bureau of Agriculture (BoA), Bureau of Water and Energy Resources Development (BoWERD), Bureau of Land (BoL) and OFWE will be supporting the ER program implementation and coordinating activities on the ground through their decentralized staff.

The carbon accounting and performance verification: EFD will lead the overall MRV undertakings of ER-Program through its dedicated MRV Unit, including collection of regional level ER performance data, analyzing the same and reporting to the WB/ISFL. EFD is Ethiopia's Coordinating Entity for MRV from land use sector through its MRV Directorate. The MRV Directorate collects and reports GHG inventory data (land use sector) and undertakes MRV tasks working in collaboration with federal and regional institutions. The OFLP-ERP will follow the same ER monitoring approach and use the same MRV institutional arrangement established at national level.

The activities financed by the BSP: The ER proceeds received as RBP will be shared among beneficiaries eligible for sharing: 20 percent for the governments (Federal and Regional), 5% to the private sector and 75% for community development programs. ER proceeds fund disbursement is to follow "Channel 1 fund transfer system". The Ministry of Finance (MoF) receives the RBP in an independent account and keeps the 3% performance buffer for risk management and deducts the operational cost.

ORCU/OEPA officially communicates the Regional Bureau of Finance (BOF) detailing the share of all eligible beneficiaries from the net payment as per the OFLP monitoring result. Accordingly, BoF transmits this disbursement request to MoF. Then MoF transfers the share of federal government to the account of EFD and the remaining net benefit and the operational cost to Oromia BoF. The BoF, based on proportion of allocated shares and decision of the OFLP Steering Committee will disburse ER proceeds downward to OEPA, woreda finance offices, FMCs and to the private sector accounts as appropriate.

The activities financed by the Grants. As part of OFLP-ERP, two grants will be provided.

The first one, for a total amount of \$750,000, will support the program management including (i) the coordination among the various programs supporting the underlying activities, (ii) the cost associated with the reporting on carbon and non-carbon benefits (coordination meeting, compiling the data, etc...), (iii) the dialog with the federal and regional institutions involved in the program as well as (iv) the support for three MRV, two MRV Assistants and four OFLP safeguard specialist

(two in Social, two for Environment).. It will ensure that the Environmental and Social system is in place and effective to identify and mitigate the impacts of the underlying activities. This grant will be managed by ORCU.

The second grant (\$1.2m) will support the design and operationalization of the MRV system set-up for the emissions related to Livestock management. This will include activities to be implemented under the leadership of the Livestock Unit of MoA and its subsidiary within the Oromia Bureau of Agriculture (OBoA), as well as activities to be implemented in support of the National MRV Unit for land use sectors in EFD. The fiduciary responsibility for this grant will be set at MoA's Livestock Unit, which will transfer the required budget according to agreed work plans to the other entities.

1.6 Key Stakeholders who are covered by current security risk assessment and Subsequent security management plan activities

Program Personnel: Staffs of Ministry of Finance, Ethiopian forest development *and* all Program Management Unit (PMU) workers of ORCU, consultants, volunteers, contracted staff, and beneficiaries involved in OFLP-ER program are covered by this security management plan.

PMU Staff: Personnel dedicated to program implementation or staffs at regional program coordination unit (ORCU) and worreda level program coordinators, regional and zonal Environment and social safeguard specialists' and program vehicle drivers at all levels

Partners/ Supplier Personnel: Employees of or contractors to third parties involved in OFLP-ER program activities, engaged either through a partnership agreement or through a service provider contract. Such as MRV contractors who perform the carbon accounting and verification

Program Affected People (PAPs): members of local communities in program areas, who are not involving in program implementation activities but who will be affected by the ongoing afforestation, reforestation and participatory forest management activities, For example community members who are living adjacent to the forest plantation or villagers who experience a change in communal grazing land access due to program related land use change.

Beneficiaries: Community members or individuals in program locations who are members of forest development cooperatives or private forest developers who are working on /contributing their personal land ownership for program afforestation/plantation activities, , the private sectors, the civil societies or individual community members who are participating in PFM.

Oromia regional state government Staffs: zonal and Worreda level workers from relevant government sector bureaus who are employees of Oromia regional government who have sake or who are involved in program implementation activities at worreda and kebele level.

Table 1.1 Summary of Key program stakeholders covered by the security management plan

Actor	Description
Ministry of finance and Ethiopian forest development	Staffs and personnel of MoF, EFD who involved in fiduciary & technical admin of the program
OEPA	Technical/steering committee workers,
ORCU	All program administration unit workers: program coordinators, Environmental and Social development experts, drivers
Zonal/woreda experts from relevant sector bureaus, NRM, land use	All program involved experts from relevant sector bureaus, bureau of agriculture and NRM, Land use, cooperative agency
Local government structure	Zonal, Woreda and kebele administrators
Contracted companies/ MRV consultants or independent verifiers	Managers and workers of 3 rd party contracted consultants like security audit or MRV companies
World Bank staffs	World Bank staffs who involved in program supervisions and implementation support

Section two: Objective and Methodological approach to current security risk assessment

For the past two years, the overall peace and security context of the country have deteriorated following the conflict between Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Federal Government of Ethiopia in November 2020. The conflict had caused immediately after the TPLF attacked the northern military base, and eventually expanded to the neighboring regions. Likewise, the security situation in some part of the Oromia region has been worsened since 2019, associated with movement of the armed wing of the Oromo liberation front which came from exile, frequent guerrilla attacks have claimed the lives of several innocent people in the region.

For the last few years, part of the rural woredas and kebeles in the Southern Oromia “(Guji and West Guji) and western Oromia (Horoguduru Wollega, West Wollega and Qeleme Wollega) zones where most of the OFLP investment interventions undertakings are being performed, (such as Afforestation, Reforestation (AR) and Participatory Forest Management (PFM)) are facing critical insecurity challenges due to armed clashes between Ethiopian National Defense Force (NDF) and the guerrilla fighters.

Hence, as leading implementing agency, the Oromia Environmental Protection Authority (OEPA) plans to assess the potential security risks and impacts on the Emission reduction program activities and the human-related security risks to ensure program outcomes are adhering to the requirements on environment and the society. The assessment was undertaken in Oromia Regional State with special emphasis on the zones and woredas particularly selected as insecurity prone and address key security challenges in intervention woredas with emphasis to challenges attributable to implementing OFLP activities at regional, zonal, and woreda levels.

2.1 Objective and Scope of the Current Security Risk assessment

The main objective of the security risk assessment is to identify the risks related to the insecurity area and their impacts on the program implementation process, program implementing parties including the communities, government staff, the program implementation coordination unit (ORCU), and the World Bank team while undertaking their customary assignments in the emission reduction phase program plan and to develop strategic plan to mitigate the envisaged impacts. The assessment was particularly focusing on the identification of impacts on humans and the implementation risk factors that could negatively affect the Emission Reduction program. The assessment is expected to lead to the development of a mitigation strategic plan for the ERP period (up to 2030). The specific objectives of the security risk assessment include;

- To scan security threats in Oromia region and their impacts on smooth implementation of the emission reduction plans;
- To identify the extent of the impact on the community, implementing personnel including implementing institutions' experts of ORCU and the World Bank team and determine the potential exposure to the foreseen risk and their impacts;
- To indicate the potential environmental and social impacts of the security risks;
- To provide operational recommendations for ensuring security threats are well captured in advance in all the ER program components and their activities;
- To propose a strategic plan to mitigate the impacts of the security risks and enhance smooth program implementation; and
- To estimate the cost of the potential impact and its implication on the future operation.

Scope of the Assessment

The assessment is undertaken in Oromia Regional State, focusing on purposefully selected program intervention zones and woredas which are deemed to be insecurity prone and hence thoroughly examined existing or potential security risks and security challenges attributable to implementing OFLP-ER program activities at the regional, zonal and local levels by;

- Conducting an in-depth program implementation document review to understand program activities with a particular focus on A/R, PFM, Livelihood interventions and perception of beneficiaries and E& S security challenges in the process and as the result of implementing these program interventions;
- Reviewing the institutional and legal framework for the program implementation in light of mitigating the perceives E&S challenges;
- Examining regional and local security risks and impacts that would affect program implementation by conducting desk review and field based security risk assessment on program activities and related issues;
- Produce social risk assessment report with detailed implementation plan;
- The Assessment will adopt participatory approach by organizing consultations with communities and key stakeholders program spatial and thematic working scope.

- The Consultant is expected to identify main security risks and provide concrete proposal on how the program would manage the challenges

2.2 Methodological approach to the security risk assessment

2.2.1 Methodology Overview

The implemented risk assessment methodology composes both primary and secondary methods of data collection. Enquiry methods are designed in a way that ensures consistency with the World Bank's Environmental and Social Framework for IPF Operations which contributes to effectively manage Program risks related to community health and safety, hence could promote sustainable development.

2.2.2 Methods of Data collection

Desk review: The Security risk assessment has been framed through a comprehensive review of relevant ER program documents such as OFLP PAD, REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP), government (national and regional) security policies, legislation, institutional roles and OFLP-ER program implementation manuals. Desk research also covers environmental and social security risk management trends and capacity assessment of identified OFLP-ER program implementing agencies. Available security management plan documents that are prepared for other World Bank financed agricultural/forest conservation programs were also being reviewed.

Institutional analysis by KII interviews and virtual meetings: institutional analysis were also carried out to identify the roles, responsibilities, and structure of the relevant institutions which have been responsible for implementing OFLP, including coordination between different entities at the National, regional and district levels.

A structured key informant interview (KII) guide was being prepared by the consultant to guide discussions and data collection on potential/actual environmental and social security risks; information sources also include existing security risk management practices among zonal and woreda level program implementing actors. Interviews and meetings also were conducted, among others, with staffs of Oromia REDD+ Coordination Unit/ORCU, OFLP E&S experts and zonal safeguards coordinators, staffs of Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise (OFWE), woreda land administration offices and environment protection bureau.

Field visits and Focus group discussions: FGD is handled in selected sample program implementation woredas or districts. Program operation sites have been visited along a certain observation-checklists for operational level performance assessment of security risk management practices. FGD discussions have also been handled with local communities (men and women, local elderlies, and program beneficiaries) in selected villages.

Field based data collection activity has been conducted in selected ten program woredas spread-out over five administrative zones. (For more information on this, Please see sampling section

below) Primary data is collected from Bunu-Bedele zone, Jimma zone, East-Wollega zone, west-guji zone and South-West Shoa Zone of Oromia in a period between; June 8 to June 25, 2022.

2.2.3 Study area selection and Sample size determination

Before the commencement of actual field-based data collection activities, the consultant together with ORCU- regional coordinator has organized introductory kickoff meeting at ORCU office of Oromia environment protection authority compound in 29th of May, 2022. By this introductory meeting, the consultant has presented a brief note on scope and objective of the current security risk assessment. Following this, participants have discussed on possible criteria of study area selection, nominate potential assessment program areas then managed to do rigorous analysis.

Initially the overall study-population areas have stratified as OFLP-ER Enabling-environment program component and Enabling investment program component. Since main deforestation spot areas are located in regions where enabling investment program-component is operating, emphasis is given to this program component. From a total of eight enabling investment program-component implementation zones of Oromia, participants are agreed to assure 50% inclusion proportion, hence the total number of sample study zones decided to becomes four.

To select those four program implementation areas, the study team has utilized the following criteria or factors of variability (being conflict prone, areas with best program implementation stories, being an area with reported incidents of Gender-Based Violence (GBV), asset destruction and finally factors of accessibility). Based on these criteria the consultant and client counterpart have selected the following four zones; Bunu-Bedele zone, Jimma zone, East-Wollega zone and west-guji zone. In each of the selected zones, two observation woredas are purposively selected for actual risk assessment data collection activities. From Jima zone; (Jimma and Seka-chekorsa woredas), from Buno-Bedelle zone; (Bedelle and Chora woredas), from East-Wollega zone; (Gutogida and Wayu-tuqa woredas) and finally from west-Guji zone; (Bore and Ardajila woredas) are selected.

On the other hand from enabling environment program-component implementation cluster areas, the client has suggested inclusion of at least one zone for potential lesson learning, hence most accessible “South-West Shoa Zone” (Woliso woreda and Seden-soddo worreda) is selected. The overall sampling procedure outcome above finally yields five Security Risk assessment observation zones and ten (10) data collection woredas. At field-work stage, the consultant together with ORCU, regional coordinator and based on field level consultation with woreda level OFLP coordinators, have selected 1-2 observation kebeles in each of selected woredas.

More importantly, based on gathered information from ORCU, regarding current security conditions of Oromia region, areas confirmed suitable for face to face data collection activities were appeared to be only three (Bedele, Jimma and South-west shoa zones), hence for the other two zones, (East-Wollega and West-Guji zone) distant/proxy data collection procedures is applied. Upon overall data collection activities, 14 FGDs are conducted with program beneficiaries/local

community members while; the study team has conducted 16 KIIs with relevant woreda level sector bureau officials.

Table 3.1 List of selected assessment worda/kebeles and number of KII/FGDs conducted

Selected zones	Worreda	Selected Kebeles	No of FGDs	No KII
Jimma zone	Seka-Chokorsa worreda	Shashamane	1	1
		Guyu Kachama	1	1
	Agaro worreda	Bore Dinsara	1	1
		Genji Ilbu	1	1
Bunu Bedele	Bedele worreda	Oddo	1	1
		shenebadiro	1	1
	Chora	DaaphoTaaboo	1	1
		Hawa-Geba	1	1
West-shoa	Woliso	Tumb^be	1	2
	Sadden Soddo	Legay^kebe	1	2
West Guji	Bore	Anno-watte	1	1
	Ardajila	Keliso-babicho	1	1
East Neqemte	Gutogida	Jiregna	1	1
	Wayu-tuqa	Gute-badiya	1	1
Total 5	10	14	14	16

Section Three: Review of Relevant National Policies and Legal-frameworks

In the course of conducting current OFLP-ER program security risk assessment, relevant existing national and international regulations, laws, Good international practices and World Bank ESF standards which are most relevant to the current security risk assessment undertakings have been reviewed. In the section below brief discussion of those legal frameworks and Good international practices is presented.

3.1 National legal frameworks and policies

The Constitution of the EFDR (1995)

The Constitution of the FDRE is the highest policy and legal document that lays the basis for all laws and policies in the country. The Constitution of FDRE provides a number of basic and comprehensive principles that consider social protection and management in the country including the sustainable development. It recognizes the existence of diverse socio-cultural groups, including historically disadvantaged and underserved communities, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and minorities as well as their rights to socioeconomic equity and justice. The relevant articles to security risks and impacts provisions among others are identified as follow.

Article (14) of the Ethiopian Constitution recognizes the right to life and security of person. The Article declares that every person has the inviolable and inalienable rights to life, has the right to get personal security protection from public security system against any security risks or acts of bodily harm.

The provision in Article (15) set outs that every person has the right to life and no person shall deprived of his life except as a punishment against a serious criminal offence which is to be determined in due process of the judicial system of the country. Article 17 stipulates on the right to liberty: no one shall be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law; no person may be subjected to arbitrary arrest; and no person may be detained without a charge or conviction against him.

As per Article (25) of the Ethiopian Constitution all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection without discrimination on grounds of race, nation, nationality, or other social origin, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status.

Whereas, Article (28) of the Constitution has provision on crimes against humanity: criminal liability of persons who commit crimes against humanity, so defined by international agreements ratified by Ethiopia and by other laws of Ethiopia, such as genocide, summary executions, forcible disappearances or torture shall not be barred by statute of limitation. The same Article further states that such offences may not be commuted by amnesty or pardon of the legislature or any other state organ. The provision on Article (32) applies to both the Ethiopian and foreign citizens. It states that any Ethiopian or foreign national lawfully in Ethiopia has, within the national territory, the right to liberty of movement and choose his residence, as well as the freedom to leave the country at any time he wishes to.

The Constitution of Ethiopian has the provisions on the rights of the citizens to access justice and the rights to labour. As set out in Article (37), everyone has the right to bring a justifiable matter to, and to obtain a decision or judgment by, a court of law or any other competent body with judicial power. Article (42) Sub-Article (2) stipulates that ‘workers have the right to a healthy and safe work environment’, obliging an employer (be it government or private) to take all necessary measures to ensure that workplace is safe, healthy and free of any danger to the wellbeing of workers. Yet, Article (87) declares on the principles for national defense. As stated in Sub-Article (3) the armed forces shall protect the sovereignty of the country and carry out any responsibilities as may be assigned to them under any state of emergency declared in accordance with the Constitution.

3.2 National Social Protection Policy of Ethiopia

The GoE has issued National Social Protection policy in 2012 with a general objective to create an enabling environment in which citizens (including people with special need and other vulnerable groups) have the right to equitable access to all social protection services that will enhance their growth and development. Ethiopia's social protection policy is a central public policy component for addressing poverty, vulnerability, and inequality.

3.3 Applicable World Bank Environmental and Social Standards (ESSs)

The World Bank's Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) requires that the Borrower assesses and manage potential environmental and social risks and impacts arising from programs that the WB supports through Investment Program Financing (IPF). As per to the WB ESF, potential threats to program workers, sites, assets and activities as well as to program-affected communities are assessed and mitigated by the Borrower throughout the program life cycle. If it is decided that security personnel should be engaged, the potential risks stemming from such engagement in turn needs to be assessed and be managed in accordance with the mitigation hierarchy.

- ***ESS1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts***

ESS1 addresses the need to assess environmental and social assessment risks and impacts, including those related to human security. As provided Annex 15(e) in ESS1, social and conflict analysis is an instrument that assesses the degree to which the program may (a) exacerbate existing tensions and inequality within society (both within the communities affected by the program and between these communities and others); (b) have a negative effect on stability and human security; (c) be negatively affected by existing tensions, conflict and instability, particularly in circumstances of war, insurrection and civil unrest.

- **ESS2: Labour and Working Conditions**

ESS2 sets out the terms and conditions of employment for employing or otherwise engaging workers on the program, specifies the requirements, standards to be met, policies, and procedures to be followed, assesses risks, and proposes implementation of compliance measures. The SRA is developed to help avoid, mitigate, and manage security risks and impacts in relation to program workers and ensure non-discrimination, equal opportunity, protection, fair treatment, and safe and healthy working conditions.

- **ESS4: Community Health and Safety**

ESS4 addresses the health, safety, and security risks to and impacts on program-affected communities and the corresponding responsibility of Borrowers to avoid or minimize such risks and impacts, with particular attention to people who, because of their particular circumstances, may be vulnerable.

As set out in ESS4 Paragraph 24, when the Borrower retains direct or contracted workers to provide security to safeguard its personnel and property, it will assess risks posed by these security arrangements to those within and outside the program site. In making such arrangements, the Borrower will be guided by the principles of proportionality and Good International Industry Practice (GIIP), and by applicable law, in relation to hiring, rules of conduct, training, equipping, and monitoring of such security workers. The Borrower will not sanction any use of force by direct or contracted workers in providing security except when used for preventive and defensive purposes in proportion to the nature and extent of the threat.

The provision in Paragraph 25 states that the Borrower will seek to ensure that government security personnel deployed to provide security services act in a manner consistent with Paragraph 24 indicated above, and encourage the relevant authorities to disclose the security arrangements for the Borrower's facilities to the public, subject to overriding security concerns.

As per Paragraph 26, the Borrower will: (i) make reasonable inquiries to verify that the direct or contracted workers retained by the Borrower to provide security are not implicated in past abuses; (ii) train them adequately (or determine that they are properly trained) in the use of force (and where applicable, firearms), and appropriate conduct toward workers and affected communities; and (iii) require them to act within the applicable law and any requirements set out in the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP).

Furthermore, as given in Paragraph 27, the Borrower will review all allegations of unlawful or abusive acts of security personnel, take action (or urge appropriate parties to take action) to prevent recurrence and, where necessary, report unlawful or abusive acts to relevant authorities.

3.4 World Bank's Good Practice Note on Assessing and Managing Risks of the use of Security Personnel

When the Borrower retains direct or contracted workers to provide security to safeguard its personnel and property, it will assess risks posed by these security arrangements to those within and outside the Program site. In making such arrangements, the Borrower will be guided by the principles of proportionality and Good International Practices, and by applicable law, in relation to hiring, rules of conduct, training, equipping, and monitoring of such security workers. The Borrower will not sanction any use of force by direct or contracted workers in providing security except when used for preventive and defensive purposes in proportion to the nature of the threat.

The Borrower will seek to ensure that government security personnel deployed to provide security services act in a manner consistent with statements in the above paragraph, and encourage relevant authorities to disclose the security arrangements for the Borrower's facilities to the public, subject to overriding security concerns. The Borrower will (i) make reasonable inquiries to verify that the direct or contracted workers retained by the Borrower to provide security are not implicated in past abuses; (ii) train them adequately (or determine that they are properly trained) in the use of force (and where applicable, firearms), and appropriate conduct toward workers and affected communities; and (iii) require them to act within the applicable law and any requirements set out

in the ESCP. The Borrower will review all allegations of unlawful or abusive acts of security personnel, take action (or urge appropriate parties to take action) to prevent recurrence, and where necessary, report unlawful acts to relevant authorities.”

Decisions on the appropriate scope of the Programs security arrangements are guided by an assessment of (a) potential risks to the Programs personnel and property, which may require a security response; (b) appropriate responses to the identified security risks; (c) potential impacts of a security incident on the Program, local communities, and other parties; and (d) potential mitigation measures.

The security arrangements for a Program may themselves pose risks to, and impacts on, Program workers and Local communities. It is important to take these risks and impacts into consideration and to determine measures to address them, and this should be part of the ongoing stakeholder engagement on the Program, as described in ESS10. Program-level grievance mechanisms that are available to Program workers, local communities, and other stakeholders allow them to provide feedback on the Program’s security arrangements and personnel.

Periodic assessment of security risks during the life of the Program allows security arrangements to be updated to reflect any new risks or changes in the operating environment. It is good practice for security arrangements to be reviewed annually, or when a major event occurs that could affect the security of the Program or the Program’s operating environment.

3.5 Other Good International Practices and Relevant Standards

There are also other international standards which could be referenced in the preparation, monitoring and implementation of upcoming OFLP-ER program Security Management Plan. Common to these Good International Practices they all emphasize that the use of security forces is based on the concept that providing security and respecting human rights can and should be consistent. This translates into implementation of policies and practices that ensure security provision is carried out responsibly, with any response being proportional to the threat.

Proactive communication, community engagement, and grievance redress are central to this approach. Communications shall also often be performed through collaboration between security and community relations departments. Gender considerations are also important, as women often have different experiences and interactions with security personnel. The specific international standards and links for the full document are indicated below.

- UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials:
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx
- UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials:
www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/LawEnforcementOfficials.aspx
- Voluntary Principles (VPs) on Security and Human Rights:
<http://www.voluntaryprinciples.org/what-are-the-voluntary-principles>

- A International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.
https://icoca.ch/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/INTERNATIONAL-CODE-OF-CONDUCT_Amended_2021.pdf
- Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Program (ACLED, which has a useful risk dashboard tool: <https://www.acleddata.com/>)
- International Finance Corporation (IFC) Handbook on the Use of Security Forces: Assessing and Managing Risks and Impacts, 2017 (available in English, French, Spanish)
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/publications/publications_handbook_securityforces

Additional World Bank References

1. World Bank Corporate Security Department:
<http://workgroup.worldbank.org/org/units/GSD/GSDCS/Pages/Travel-Security.aspx>
2. World Bank Corporate Security Courses
<http://workgroup.worldbank.org/org/units/GSD/GSDCS/Pages/Course-Offerings.aspx>

Section Four: Country Security Context and Threat assessment

4.1 Political and security context in Ethiopia

4.1.2 Ethnic Federalism

Ethiopia became an ethnic-based federal state after the ratification of the federal constitution in 1994. The new constitution gave ethnic groups the right to self-government as well as the option to secede. After the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, Ethiopia was divided into nine regional states (*kililoch*, singular-*kilil*) and two administratively independent cities. At the end of June 2020, Sidama became the tenth regional state of Ethiopia¹. Based on a referendum vote held on September 30, 2021, south west Ethiopia people regional state also go official since 23rd of November, 2021 as Ethiopia's eleventh regional state.

The purpose of the system of 'ethnic federalism' was on the one hand to meet the wishes of the different ethnic groups in Ethiopia and on the other hand to keep the country together. Yet, critics believe that the system has placed too much emphasis on the ethnic awareness of Ethiopians and even aggravated ethnic based oppressions. Particularly the younger generations see themselves as 'Oromo', 'Tigrayan', 'Amhara', or 'Somali' rather than 'Ethiopian'².

4.1.3 Illegal opposition movements

After the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Patriotic Ginbot 7 (PG7) had been removed from the list of terrorist organizations in the summer

1 Anadolu Agency, Ethiopia: 10th regional government goes official, 18 June 2020

2 The New York Times, Opinion: The Trouble With Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism, 3 June 2019; International Crisis Group, Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents , page 22,

of 2018, there were no more opposition movements that were officially classified as illegal. Only terrorist organizations Al Qaida and Al Shabaab, which the international community has also labeled as terrorist, are regarded as such by Ethiopia. PG7 merged with the new E-ZEMA party and the OLF and the ONLF officially registered as a political party in Ethiopia. Various sources say that there is no such thing as one OLF because of the different splinter factions. However, removal of the organizations from list of terrorist organizations did not signal an end to subversive and illegal activities of certain organizations. According to *The Economist*, dissident OLF members who did not support the policy of the political faction withdrew to the forests at the end of 2018, from where they carried out attacks on military targets, among other things³.

OLF/OLA/Shene, various source reported that most of the OLF fighters who had arrived from Eritrea had surrendered their weapons, while OLF fighters who had never left Ethiopia and had continued fighting on Ethiopian soil had more difficulty giving up their weapons. Amnesty International writes that the armed struggle in Oromia is being continued by a faction that has separated from the military wing of the OLF. This splinter movement, which according to Amnesty International calls itself the *Oromo Liberation Army* (OLA), is critical of Prime Minister Abiy's reforms, which it believes run counter to the interests of the ethnic Oromo. The military branch rejected the peace treaty that was signed by Ethiopian government and the OLF and refused to disarm⁴.

According to *The Reporter*, the army of the OLF, the OLA, or in Afaan Oromo *Waraana Bilisummaa Oromoo* (WBO), declared in an official statement in April 2019 that they no longer have a relationship with the party or the leadership in Addis Ababa. The statement said that despite OLA's desire to join a ceasefire and discuss disputes with the government, the government continued to fight OLA and arrest its fighters. The government accused OLA of not having fully disarmed itself, contrary to the agreements.

ACLED (*Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Program*) wrote after OLA's statement that the split between the political and military factions could lead to more violence in different parts of Ethiopia. It is not known how many fighters the OLA/Shene has. There are estimates ranging from 1,500 to several thousand fighters. This also raises the question of whether this involves an orchestrated rebellion or of a mishmash of groups⁵.

4.1.4 Reforms taken by the new government

After taking office in the spring of 2018, the new Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy announced reforms that envisioned a more democratic and prosperous Ethiopia. The new administration released political prisoners and reviewed a number of controversial laws. His administration also sought to engage with outlawed opposition movements such as the *Ogaden National Liberation Front* (ONLF), the *Oromo Liberation Front* (OLF) and *Patriotic Ginbot 7* (PG7), many of which

3 Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2020 – Ethiopia*, Key Developments, 4 March 2020.

4 *The Economist*, *Onslaught in Oromia, A hidden war threatens Ethiopia's transition to democracy*, 19 March 2020.

5 ACLED, *Regional Overview: Africa 24-30 November 2019*, 3 December 2019

had their registered offices abroad. Abiy invited these parties to return to Ethiopia to participate legally in Ethiopian politics.

In the context of the reforms agenda, the Ethiopian Parliament unanimously approved a proposal at the beginning of July 2018 to remove the ONLF, the OLF and PG7 from the national list of terrorist organizations. Abiy made peace with neighboring Eritrea, for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2019. Yet, all of these reforms have contributed little in prevailing peace and certainty in the country.

In the context of the reforms, Abiy's government has taken steps to prosecute certain senior officials of the previous government, notably members of the TPLF, for human rights violations. On the other hand, the current government has also decided to adopt a policy of forgiveness for lower officials in the wider spectrum of reconciliation efforts. Amnesty International wrote that while the first steps had been taken towards improving the human rights situation in Ethiopia, the old pattern of violence adopted by the security forces, such as extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests at demonstrations, had not disappeared. According to Amnesty International, this could jeopardize the long-term goals of the government⁶.

4.1.5 Violence and conflicts By Shene/OLA

The dissident OLA/Shene has not accepted the peace deal with the government and is waging an armed struggle against the government, which includes carrying out targeted operations against government officials. ACLED wrote in December 2019 that in the previous twelve months, Shene was reportedly responsible for the deaths of at least eight Oromia state government officials. The *United States Department of State* (USDoS) also reported two kidnappings by Shene/OLA, (where one of the hostages was eventually killed⁷).

Reports from various source also shows that, in addition to violence actions against government officials, reports mention the presence of violence and operations by this organization against the local population. For example member of shene have looted local farms to find food. on the other hand, Due to the Tigray conflict, OLA/Shene was said to be using advantage on the withdrawal of federal troops from Western Oromia and the resulting power vacuum as a pretext for ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the area. An adviser to the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) said that since November 2020, more than fifty ethnic Amhara in western Oromia had been killed in an attempt by OLA/Shene to expel them from the region. Even by the time of this security risk assessment undertaking (June 18, 2022), ethnic cleansing of more than 200 (“Ethnic Amhara”) civilians is reported in West-Wollega, Gimbi worreda, Tole kebele.

4.1.6 Major areas of operation by illegal opposition movements

Oromia region is often reported to be the hotspot of most violent/conflict problems in Ethiopia, particularly the west and south of this region. Following the violence by OLA/Shene, the federal

6 AI, Beyond Law Enforcement, Human Rights Violations by Ethiopian Security Forces in Amhara and Oromia, 29 May 2020

7 USDoS, Ethiopia 2019 Human Rights Report, page 3, 11 March 2020

government declared a state of emergency in 2019 in the zones of Wollega (also known as Wollega) and Guji zone of Oromia regional state⁸. Previously illegal opposition movements such as OLF, ONLF, BPLM, and PG7 returned to Ethiopia from Eritrea after Ahmed Abiy took office. According to Ezega News, the OLA/Shene had been trained in Kenya after 2018. The Ethiopian authorities accused unidentified armed groups operating from Sudanese territory of carrying out massacres in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. The groups involved were unknown, but the Ethiopian authorities alluded to the involvement of the TPLF.

4.1.7 Recent Country Security contexts summary

As stated earlier in the above paragraphs of this chapter, the optimism from the government change in 2018 has disappeared and there is division in Ethiopia. Various local and international sources describe Ethiopia as a country with political and ethnic conflict everywhere.

The World Bank group has also categorized Ethiopia as Fragile, Conflict and Violence (FCV) State following the observed continuation of instability in the country since June 2021. According to Amnesty International, it is often unclear who is fighting who and who is responsible for the violence⁹. Freedom House also writes that the period after Abiy took office as Prime Minister was marked by political and ethnic tensions, resulting in armed insurrection and inter-ethnic violence in Amhara, Oromia, Harar, Dire Dawa, Benishangul, and SNNPR¹⁰.

The Ethiopian government is facing increasing conflicts and estrangement along ethnic, religious, political and regional lines. The resulting tensions have regularly led to violence and fatalities. The climax of these mounting conflicts was reached in early November 2020, when an armed struggle broke out between militias from Tigray on one hand, and federal forces backed by militias and forces from other regions, notably from Amhara and Afar, on the other hand.

In response to the armed violence, the government set up command posts in the west (Wollega) and south (Guji) of Oromia at the end of 2018¹¹. The aim of these command posts was to coordinate the operations of the regional and federal security forces against OLA/Shene in the region. Moreover, long-standing feuds over land access, the demarcation of inter-regional borders and complex identity issues in the country have led to inter-ethnic violence, massacres and the large-scale internal displacement of citizens in Ethiopia¹².

Although more political space was created after Abiy's takeover of power in 2018, several peoples in Ethiopia believe that inter-ethnic violence has increased since the federal security forces are no longer able to bring certain parts of Ethiopia under their control. In addition, due to widespread

⁸Addis Standard, Ethiopian forces kill 20 gunmen in western region, 16 November 2020.

⁹ Amnesty international, beyond law enforcement, Human right violations by Ethiopian security forces in Amhara and Oromia, 29 may, 2020

¹⁰ Freedom House, "Ethiopia Working Group: Ethiopia's path to a more stable and democratic future is increasingly at risk,"

¹¹ The Economist, Oromia, A hidden war threatens Ethiopia's transition to democracy, 19 March 2020.

¹² OCHA, Humanitarian Access Snapshot-Ethiopia, page1-2 July 2021

arms smuggling in the country there is an abundance of weapons, and this is adversely affecting the country security situation¹³.

4.2 Security Context in program area

Since the past three years, the security situation in Oromia regional state of Ethiopia has been showing unpredictable changes and remained unstable. The emergence of guerrilla fighting groups in Oromia's western and southern zones has also fueled another tension in the national security and Oromia region in particular. Robbery killing of civilians and fear and tension in civil life, incidents of gender-based violence, and many more undesirable socio-economic and political outcomes were among the bad stories from different news outlets.

Ethiopia's largest forested landscapes are found in Oromia National Regional State which provides critical ecosystem services to the country and the region. Most of Oromia's high forest is found in Bale landscape in southeast and the Jimma/Illubabor landscape in southwest and Wollega landscape in the west.

OFLP-ER program is operating at jurisdictional-scale landscape of Oromia region. Hence in past two years, across many of the OLFP-ER program intervention areas, there were recurrent incidences of both ethnic based violence and armed conflict between government forces and armed insurgent group.

For example Part of the rural woredas and kebeles in the Southern (Guji and West Guji) and western (West Wollega and Qeleme Wollega), also Horoguduru zone are facing critical insecurity challenges due to armed clashes between Ethiopian National Defense Force (NDF) and the guerrilla fighters. In connection to this, reports from program implementation units mentioned that most of the OFLP-ER program investment intervention activities such as Afforestation, Reforestation (AR) and Participatory Forest Management (PFM) are indicated to be interrupted at least for some time.

More importantly, on top of slowing the pace of the implementation process, the situation would be feared to pose a threatening state to the people who are working in nurseries, community members who participate in the ground activities, government experts program personnel who are in charge of coordinating the implementation and facilitating monitoring program outcomes that would be used as an input for monitoring and verification purposes.

Section Five: Program Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation Measures

5.1 Potential security risk identification

The first priority step of determining the level and types of security arrangement the program might demand is assessment and categorization of the potential security risks. The level of effort required should be implied proportionate to the threat-environment into which the program is operating.

13 USDoS, Ethiopia 2019 Human Rights Report, page 1, 11 March 2020.

Identification of potential security risks is ranging from a relatively straightforward screening of risks to broader undertakings of more formal and comprehensive security risk assessment which again may need to consider more in-depth political, cultural, military or other socio-economic aspects.

5.1.1 Contextual security risks

A. Territorial and Village-border Conflicts

Risk assessment findings in majority of data collection woredas revealed that in addition to being source of livestock grazing spots, and source of firewood biomass, forests are serving the role of boundary demarcation. FGD participants in Agaro, Bedele and Woliso woredas often mention forests as boundaries between adjacent communities or even between different ethnic groups. In connection to this, competition over forest-oriented natural resources or access to the forest biomass could often transform to recurrent disputes or border conflicts.

B. Forests as a hiding and training spot of armed groups

The security risk assessment consultation findings in some program areas (e.g in west Wollega, Guji, Borena and even in some part of east-Wollega) involve distinct political and security contextual risk factors. OFLP-ER Program operation forest areas in this cluster are indicated to be hiding or training sport of armed groups (OLA), while they are locomoting in those areas.

On those instances of temporary forest-encampment, and especially if the forest is near to the living settlements, informants mentioned the risk of looting or compulsory livestock donation, robbery, carjacking, arrest/detention, killing of civilians and fear and prevalent tensions in civil life. Furthermore, when Ethiopian National defense forces are coming to counter-attack those armed groups, community members are still facing critical insecurity challenges due to armed clashes between Ethiopian National Defense Force (NDF) and the guerrilla fighters.

C. Wildfire related security risks

The risk of wildfire is also repeatedly indicted as the most common contextual security risk of forest areas. According to informants, especially when agricultural farming lands are located in near proximity to forest areas, on those arid seasons, the risk of wildfire transference to farm plots or nearby settlements is high. On the same fashion, when farmers are practicing farm burning (as part of preparation for next farming), often it becomes out of control and poses considerable physical safety risk of fire transfer/expansion to forests coverage. Though human-life casualties are not being indicated, FGD participants in Jimma and Agaro areas mentioned huge loss of agricultural harvests from wildfire.

D. Historically or Politically rooted Inter-ethnic conflicts

Both KII and FGD participants have also indicated the prevalence of historically rooted ethnic conflicts in some parts of OFLP-ER program implementation areas in Oromia. For example the recurrent conflict between Guji Oromo and Gedieo ethnic groups in West-Guji zone, conflict

between Guji and Burji. Interview participants also mentioned the protracted conflict between Borena Oromo and Garre clan of Somali over administrative borders as well as over resource competition for pasture lands.

Still on the eastern Wollega program implementation areas such as (Horoguduru zone, Burre) there had been repeated cases of ethnic conflicts between Oromo and Amhara ethnic groups. Though competition over natural resources and land/border claims are indicated to be the initial reasons of disputes, sooner they will be changed to administrative borders disputes and have escalated into a full-scale conflict scenario of the rivalry ethnic groups or even between the respective regional states.

E. Cattle raiding as source of recurring conflicts

In some of OFLP-ER Program implementation areas; specifically on those Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, a cattle raiding is another source of recurring conflicts which are common to all the pastoral/agro-pastoral communities of the program areas. Cattle raiding are generally considered as an acceptable means to acquire assets, whether in times of retaliatory conflicts or under normal circumstances. In particular, the need for cattle is very important for young men who have no assets, as their inheritance is often small because it is divided among many siblings.

5.1.2. Actual and Potential Program Induced Security Risks

In general terms, potential or actual security risks of a program may arise from: (a) operation area dynamics that include contextual circumstances (e.g. livelihood options, poverty, crime, legacy issues such as unsettled political claims or unresolved land disputes), direct safety threats (e.g. organized crime/violence, anti-industry movements, and armed conflict),

national security requirements, (b) *relationship with local communities* related directly to program operations (e.g. labor and workplace, community health and well-being, access to land or natural resources, resettlement, compensation), external agitation for actions that the program does not take (e.g. unmet community expectations, or where benefit sharing is perceived to be lacking or unfair); and (c) *security response to an incident* such as escalation from past interactions that increased tensions with communities.

Conceiving all these contextual factors, current OFLP-ER program security risk assessment identifies the below listed actual and potential security risks.

1. Common and External security risks factoring program operation activities

External Risks include such as those caused by the actions of local community members outside program operation domain who seek to take advantage of opportunities presented by the program operation in the area. This includes such as cattle trespassing for grazing, petty theft, right of way block, and community protests. KII informants in Woliso area mention the presence of preferential fruit seedling theft from nursery sites. Theft of fruit and chat-harvest products from agricultural

fields is also repeatedly indicated as everyday life security threats in most of program operation sites.

2. Program area land demarcation induced disputes or conflicts

The program (OFLP-ER) has mostly secured afforestation/RA and PFM activity lands in two modalities; one through voluntary contribution of private lands from individual land owner who agreed to plant forests/trees and who will also independently conserve, utilize or benefits from the program outcomes.

The second modality of program land ownership is group based allocation of plantation land from woreda land administration bureau. Based on certain eligibility¹⁴ criteria the woreda land bureau organize individuals into forest development cooperative, and then allocate specific designated land area for forest cultivation, so that the cooperative members will collaboratively work and benefiting together from forest development activity outcomes.

As part of land ownership assurance, the woreda land-bureau also provides land registration and ownership certification to the cooperatives. Yet FGD participants from Jimma and Bedele areas indicates presence of disputes over forest land demarcation issues and complains over forest boundary claims among bordering communities in adjacent woredas. Moreover, incidences of conflicts over forestry-buffer zones were also happening between forestry cooperative's plantation areas and bordering communities farming plots.

3. Competition and conflict between local villagers and forest management cooperatives

FGD participants repeatedly raised the presence of disputes and competitions between cooperative members and local community dwellers of program operation areas over issues of forbidden cattle grazing or on access claims to natural resources from program designated plantation areas. FGD participants in Agaro areas also mentioned observed gaps in ownership certification procedures and insecure benefit entitlement of forest management cooperatives which could lead to conflict of interest between villagers and cooperative members.

4. Program Service-induced conflicts/Especially after of ER-payment effectiveness

As OFLP-ER program activities are targeting only certain groups of community members (Forest management cooperatives members or PFM participants) than participation of all community members. Though selections of program beneficiary or participating community members are targeted based on objectively sated criteria and in a participatory manner, some community members could later feel that they are disadvantaged and are nor benefiting from program reward outcomes.

¹⁴ possible eligibility criteria includes willingness to contribute some plantation land, saving commitment, willing to be a member of the cooperative and work in collaboration etc.

Especially after the ER-payment effectiveness, non-participating community members could perceive alienations from the program benefits. Consequently, conflict of interest, competition and new-aspirations for membership in cooperatives may occur between community members, who are part of the program and who are not participating.

5. Wild animals' attacks on humans and crops

Evenly across all assessment areas, wild animals attack related security risks are mentioned to be the most common program related security risks. According to FGD participants, especially on areas where forest is found near to farming lands or when program operation areas are located in proximity to villagers' settlements, there are significant reported incidences of human safety issues as well as damages to agricultural crops from wild animals' attacks or encroachment.

KII informants from Woliso worreda natural resource management offices stated that though OFLP-related afforestation or PFM activities are resulting promising achievements in wild animal population increment and wild-life restocking, there are also observed cases of unintended outcomes like crop destructions and attacks on humans. On scenarios where there are limited wild-Animals-edible forest vegetation coverage, coupled with uncontrolled reproduction of wild animals, encroachment of wild-Animals to farming lands as well as intrusion/attack to villagers' settlements are increasingly observed.

FGD participants in Woliso, Jimma and Bedele areas uniformly mentioned huge amount of crop loss (maize, potato, wheat, and banana) due to encroachment from rhinos, monkey, wild-pig and other wild animals, which even sometimes brings total harvest loss. Moreover, in some program PFM sites, human life threatening safety risks are reported from rhino and snake bites, respondents in Woliso also mentioned the death of children from rhino attacks.

6. Road safety and transport related human physical safety risks

Though incidence cases are small, risks assessment result has also confirmed the prevailing of road safety risks and road traffic accidents, especially to woreda level OFLP-ER program coordinators and relevant woreda bureau officers who engaged in regular program supervision and implementation support. According to KII informants, in most remote and inaccessible forest plantation site of poor gravel road coverage, road accidents from motorbike travel is repeatedly observed, which in some of instances have resulted in serious physical injury.

7. Workplace accidents and safety risks to forest management cooperatives members

Both government/ program workers (E.g. nursery workers) and Forest management cooperatives members from the community mentioned the poor availability of personal safety protection equipment (PPE). FGD participants in all of assessment woredas mentioned that they have never utilized hand gloves or safety shoes while they are working on forest plantations or nursery sites.

Respondents also mentioned significant challenges of worm attacks and slippery fall issues, especially in rainy seasons. KII respondents in Woliso and Bedelle woredas also mentioned the

poor PPE utilization culture by members of forest management cooperatives and even by government nursery site workers, owing to both financial constraints as well as awareness gaps.

8. Impacts from program security response: Program security management activities

Assessment findings shows that, only very few of the OFLP-ER program sites do have public security forces or contracted forestry site guards who are warding plantation areas. Yet still, the majority of forest management cooperatives do manage plantation area security by assigning their own members rotationally.

On either of security arrangements above, there is a risk that individual security guards could acts engage in a way which are not in compliance with principles of proportionality, good international practice, and program security code of conduct.

For example, both the public and privately contracted security personnel might engage in unlawful behavior when interacting with someone suspected of theft, or they might use excessive force in dispersing a community protest. They might also commit rape or other gender based violence acts (GBV) including sexual exploitation and abuse. More importantly, program security response may be backed with escalation from past interactions that could increase tensions within and among the program affected communities.

9. Program area and program activity induced GBV risks:

FGD respondents in Jimma, Bedele and Agaro program implementation areas mentioned the little prevalence of GBV offences in forestry or program implementation contexts. Yet security risk assessment respondents from Woliso and Guji areas stated the high prevalence of GBV including sexual harassment acts in broader community everyday life, which implies the considerable potential risk of GBV/SH acts in program operation.

Moreover, due to nature of the program; as most of Emission Reduction (ER) program activities will be conducted in fields, women traveling alone to nursery/ afforestation sites or when men and women forestry-cooperative members are working together in forests; there are anticipated risks of GBV/SH.

10. Armed conflict between insurgents and government forces leading to program interruptions

Some of program afforestation/reforestation areas, especially forests in west-Wollega, Borena and Guji areas are found to be the encampment and training spot of armed groups, which poses significant human security risk to OFLP-ER program workers as well as for Forest management cooperatives members who are performing afforestation/reforestation activities in the area.

KII informants from Woliso worreda land administration bureau also mentioned the prevailing fear of experts and program workers to walk around and perform forest versus agriculture plot boundary demarcation activities, especially if those afforestation areas are bordering forests

labeled or indicated as being hiding spot of armed insurgents. Moreover, assessment respondents from west-Wollega and west-Guji have mentioned recurrent incidence of road closers and challenges of mobility across program sites related to cross fire between government forces and insurgents.

Challenges of accessibility are more sensible to woreda level woreda experts and ORCU staffs who have to traveling across main-asphalt road. Yet, FGD participants from local communities have indicated limited challenges of mobility or accessibility to program implementation sites as conflict related road closers are often happening in main-asphalt road areas than remote rural village locations.

On the other hand, while government forces (national defense force or Oromia special force) are coming to these forest areas for law enforcement operations, extended armed clashes are erupted between armed insurgents and government force. On those periods of cross-fire, all program activities are getting suspended. Respondents from Wollega and Guji zones mentioned the repeated incidences of road closures, carjacking and subsequent program activities interruptions from such armed cross fires/fights.

5.2 Security Risk Analysis and Risk Rating

For the above actual and potential security risks identified, the level of the security risk classification is made based on the Risk Analysis Model given by UNSMS Risk Analysis tool. This risk analysis model utilizes the two factor methods; the first is the occurrence probability, which is the measure of certainty that an event, or risk, will occur (Likelihood), while the Second factor is estimate of the impact or severity descriptions and rating (severity of impact).

First-Factor: For the purpose of current assignment (OFLP-ER program) security risk analysis, the first factor, Likelihood is measured on a scale of 1-5 or; frequent, Likely, Occasional, Seldom, and Improbable as defined in the Table 5.1 below:

Table 5.1: Probability of Security Risk Occurrence

Probability of Occurrences		
Likelihood (L)	Meaning and descriptors	Rating
Frequent	Occurs frequently <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Will be continuously experienced unless action is taken to change. • Wild animal attacks on crops or agricultural harvests 	5
Likely	Occur less frequently if process is corrected <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issues identified with minimal activity • Work place injuries from not using PPE, like safety shoes or gloves • serious Injuries from motor-bicycle riding 	4
Occasional	Occurs sporadically <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential issues discovered during focused review. • Burning assets/crop fields from wild-fire in the forests • quarrels between villagers & forest-cooperatives over access to natural resource especially on dry seasons 	3
Seldom	Unlikely to occur <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal issue identification during focused review • Sexual harassment on women while working in the forest • Land demarcation induced disputes or conflicts over cooperatives land boundary 	2
Improbable	Highly unlikely to occur <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Petty theft, looting of program materials by cooperative members or PFM participants 	1

Second-factor: Another unit of measurement in this regard is risk severity descriptions and ratings. Table 5.2 below illustrates risk severity, potential triggering factors and rating number. Again, for current assignment, Impact of an event is measured on 1-5 scale from Negligible, Low, Moderate, High and Critical.

Table 5.2: Risk Security Description and Rating

Severity (S)	Potential Trigger	Rating
Critical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Armed clashes in program area, armed robbery or project car highjack • Multiple fatalities • Serious assault/fatal accident on program team member; • Absence/lack of Government forces to ensure security. 	5
High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Temporary road closures in program areas • Community unrest/conflict between community members impacting program activities • Armed robbery at office/ plantation activity location may be serious and impacting program activities • Serious injury/illness of program personnel like accident from motor-bicycle • Armed conflict nearby impacting program activities (Between 100-200 km radius of program operation area) • GBV/SEA/SH offense on Women program workers 	4
Moderate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement Restriction alert from government • Natural disasters like flood or wildfire resulting Suspension of activities for short period of time; 	3

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conflict between villagers and forest cooperatives with threats of violence. Milder workplace accidents/injury on program personnel. GBV/SEA/SH allegations on program worker 	
Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Infrequently, happening ethnic conflict; Minor conflict between program villages and bordering communities but not affect the program activities incident affecting program personnel, like light work place injuries/OHS accidents 	2
Negligible	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operational disagreements by community members or /program stakeholders on program related undertakings Disagreement between Program Manager and WB TTL; Minor conflicts between forest-cooperative members 	1

Hence the overall, OFLP-ER program security risk can be calculated using the following formula risk matrix as indicated in table 5.3 below:

Relative Risk = L*S whereas, ‘L’ stands for likelihood of occurrence and ‘S’ stands for severity of impact

Table 5.3: Risk rating Matrix

<i>Likelihood (L)</i>	<i>Severity (S)</i>				
	1	2	3	4	5
5	5	10	15	20	25
4	4	8	12	16	20
3	3	6	9	12	16
2	2	4	6	8	10
1	1	2	3	4	5

	<i>Critical</i>		<i>High</i>		<i>Medium</i>		<i>Low</i>		<i>Negligible</i>
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5.3 Risk Prioritization

Critical, high, moderate, low, and negligible security risk ratings are assigned to activities based on their likelihood of risk occurrence and the severity of the risk. The severity column that best describes the risk result can be found using the risk matrix and relative risk value. Then, in the likelihood row, choose the best description for the possibility of the incident occurring. The risk level is indicated in the box at the intersection of the row and column.

The relative risk value can be used to prioritize necessary activities for effectively managing the security risks associated with the proposed program. As a result, table 5.6 below determines priority using the following ranges.

Table 5.6: Risk Level and Priority Indicators

Risk value	Risk level	Action
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21-25	Critical	Ongoing operations are unsustainable and program may be suspended for indefinite periods. Implementation of relocation or evacuation plan, Moreover engagement of third party monitoring firms might also be an option to assure continuation of certain program operations
15-20	High	It requires priority and immediate action to control the risk or to avoid minimize or treat through appropriate mitigation measures.
5-14	Moderate	It requires a planned approach to control the risks and apply temporary measures if required.
2-4	Low	It may be considered as acceptable and further reduction may not be necessary. However if the risk can be resolved quickly and efficiently, control measures should be implemented.
1	Negligible	No need of further action

*Based on the above risk rating procedure, the security risk value of OFLP-ER program operation is Calculated and presented in the table 5.4 below

Security risks identified	Likelihood (L)	Jimma					Buno-Bedele					West-Shoa					West Guji					East Wollega					West Wollega				
Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)						
1		2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	
Territorial/Village-border Conflicts	5																		*												
	4																					*									
	3											*															*				
	2			*				*																							
	1																														
Hiding or encampment of armed groups in forest/plantation areas, robbery	5																	*											*		
	4								*													*									
	3																														
	2			*																											
	1											*																			
Burning assets/crop fields from wild-fire in the forests	5																														
	4																														
	3				*													*													
	2								*			*								*					*						
	1																														
Historically or politically rooted Inter-ethnic conflicts	5																														
	4																		*				*								
	3											*															*				
	2		*					*																							
	1																														
Wild animals' attacks on humans and crops	5													*																	
	4				*				*																						
	3																	*				*									
	2																									*					
	1																														
Program area land demarcation induced disputes or conflicts	5																														
	4			*				*				*																			
	3																	*			*				*						
	2																														
	1																														

Table 5.4 Calculated Security Risk Value for OFLP-ER program

Security risks identified	Likelihood	Jimma					Buno-Bedele					West-Shoa					West Guji					East Wollega					West Wollega				
	(L)	Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)					Severity(S)				
Armed conflict between insurgents and government forces affecting program operation <i>Resulted (Insecure road or access blockage)</i>	5																														
	4																														
	3			*					*																						
	2												*																		
	1																														
Conflict between local villagers and forest-cooperatives over access to natural resource	5																														
	4																														
	3		*					*				*				*															
	2																	*										*			
	1																														
Work place injuries/safety risks, including road safety	5																														
	4																														
	3		*					*				*				*			*									*			
	2																														
	1																														
Common security risks such as petty theft, looting of program materials	5																														
	4																														
	3																														
	2										*				*																
	1	*					*									*			*				*				*				
Program area nature and program activity induced GBV risks	5																														
	4												*																		
	3															*				*							*				
	2			*					*																						
	1																														
Program Service-induced conflicts especially after ER-payment discharge	5																														
	4																														
	3		*					*				*				*			*		*			*			*				
	2																														
	1																														

Table 5.4 (continued) Calculated Security Risk Value for OFLP-ER program

More importantly, based on the results of the above table, (summary of the relative risk level values of different program operation areas/clusters is indicated in the upcoming table 5.5 below for each of assessment areas.

Table 5.5: Relative Security Risk Values cross various areas of program implementation

	Security risks identified		Jimma	Bedele	W-shoa	W-Guji	East Wollega	West Wollega
1	Territorial or Village-border Conflicts	H	4	4	6	20	12	9
2	Hiding/encampment of armed groups in forest/plantation areas, robbery	C	4	16	2	20	16	25
3	Burning assets/crop fields from wild-fire in the forests	M	9	6	4	9	6	4
4	Historically or politically rooted Inter-ethnic conflicts	H	4	4	6	16	6	12
5	Wild animals' attacks on humans and crops	H	16	16	20	9	9	6
6	Program area land demarcation induced disputes or conflicts over cooperatives land boundary	M	12	12	12	9	9	9
7	Armed conflict between insurgents and government forces affecting program operation, insecure road	C	9	9	6	20	16	25
8	Conflict between local villagers and forest-cooperatives over access to natural resource	M	6	6	6	9	4	4
9	Workplace injuries/safety risks, including road safety	M	6	6	6	6	6	6
10	Common security risks such as petty theft, looting of program materials	L	1	1	2	2	1	1
11	Program area nature and program activity induced GBV risks	M	6	6	12	9	9	9
12	Program Service-induced conflicts especially after ER-payment release/discharge	M	6	6	6	6	6	6
13	Impacts from program security response or from deployment of public or private security personnel	L	2	2	4	4	2	2

Generally, the overall OFLP-ER program is assessed as a substantial security risk program. The risk analysis identified twelve (12) key security risks in program regions having; two critical risks, three High risks, six medium risks, one low risks, and no negligible /very low risks. From these, we can conclude that the overall OFLP-ER program risk is rated as substantial.

Yet still prevailing complex security risks or unpredictable conflict dynamics of some program implementation areas (for e.g West-Wollega and Guji) necessitates area specific security risk assessment and security management plans. Hence, certain program implementation worriedas/villages with recurrent ethnic conflicts or hiding spots of armed insurgents will remains requiring a special attention compared to other program areas.

Table 5.6: Summary of Triggering Factors and Mitigation Mechanisms

Security Risks Identified	Triggering Factors	Rating
Territorial/Village-border Conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Claims over land ownership and self-government/territorial contestation -Resource based competition -Seasonal mobility and extensive use of environment (pastoral communities) -Discontent on approaches employed to solve previous or existing conflicts -Lack of concrete evidence on historical and political contexts of land ownership and administration -Infiltration by armed groups -Malpractice on ethno-regional administration especially on districts located bordering Oromia and Somali regional states of Ethiopia (e.g., among Borana and Garri) -Irregular and unwelcomed settlements among different ethnic groups -House burning and livestock stealing among one another -Resource competition among displaced and host communities -Free flow of international migrants in some areas (for instance from Somalia) 	
Hiding/encampment of armed groups in forest/plantation areas, robbery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Forests provide shelter and a protected pathway for movement of rebels, - Forests are “lootable” (requiring low cost and low skill for extraction), especially when located near roads, coasts, or navigable rivers. - Being more difficult to control, forests provide a revenue source for insurgencies - The diffuse footprint also necessitates the use of security forces for remote operations, who often act unaccountably and may even be combatants forces themselves, directly contributing to violence. 	
Burning assets/crop fields from wild-fire in the forests		
Historically or politically rooted Inter-ethnic conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Ethno-regional strife and division -Weak intermarriage relationships 	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Division of resources among different inter-regional and intra-region ethno-groups -Absence of lasting solution to continuously dynamic conflict scenarios -Shift on center-periphery relation across different Ethiopian regimes -Activating dichotomy among different groups with political and economic motives and failure to manage it properly -Competition over scarce grazing fields and water, and clan based raiding livestock <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Shrinkage of rangelands due to different factors intensifies competition over pasture and water -Conversion of rangelands for farming scheme -Fragmentation of grazing lands by settlements, by national parks and by war and conflict -Absence of perennial source of water within one ethnic group leads to conflict with the one who have it -Increase in the number of human and animal population -Deterioration in the livelihood options -Policy gaps and institutional malfunctioning -Ethnicization of state institutions -Ethnic clientelism where different groups fight to place their own representatives in key political and economic positions -Using ethnicity as a lever used by politicians to mobilize supporters in pursuit of power, wealth, and resources -Identifying groups as indigenous and non-indigenous from their respective point of view -Uneven distribution of development impacts is often a source of conflict and a challenge for peace <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Corruption, nepotism, exclusion, injustice, and unequal distribution of national resources - Inequitable social and economic system, leading to exploitation and economic inequalities - Conflict and inter communal violence escalation -Historical memories of grievances -Political entrepreneurs -Institutional/political system factors intolerance 	
Wild animals' attacks on humans and crops		

Program area land demarcation induced disputes or conflicts over cooperatives land boundary		
Armed conflict between insurgents and government forces affecting program operation, insecure road	-Steady inflow of firearms and infiltrations of various armed groups, especially around Moyale -Delayed government intervention whenever there was a violent conflict -The active involvement of community members in firearms markets and collaboration with arm smugglers, -	
Conflict between local villagers and forest-cooperatives over access to natural resource		
Workplace injuries/safety risks, including road safety		
Common security risks such as petty theft, looting of program materials		
Program area nature and program activity induced GBV risks		
Program Service-induced conflicts especially after ER-payment release/discharge		
Impacts from program security response or from deployment of public or private security personnel		

5.4 Proposed Mitigation Measures

As with the performance of other environmental and social standards, the program security management should apply the mitigation hierarchies, that is, avoid, minimize, compensate for or off-set negative impacts. Program security mitigation measures are identified after specific threats are identified, and only after existing mitigation or prevention measures have been assessed for strengths and weaknesses and when the impact and likelihood of those threats have been evaluated to determine the risk.

Security risk mitigation measures may include information, training, briefings, specialist resources, and equipment, physical improvements to premises or facilities, or procedural changes. However, all measures presented must be directly linked to the preceding assessment, assisting to

reduce either the likelihood or the impact of an event, or both, they should be logical, feasible and relevant. Experience, judgment and creativity play a critical role in this step.

As shown in table 5.7 below, the following are the proposed measures of security risk mitigation which helps to specifically address the security risks and impacts identified:

Table 5.7 Proposed mitigation measures

Security Risks Identified	Proposed Mitigation Measures	Responsible Body
Territorial or Village-border Conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducting socio-economic conflict analysis to understand the root cause of border conflicts in program implementation areas. • Map out' individuals, organizations and strategies that could help resolve border conflicts • Early identification and management of conflict Intensifying factors: ethnic conflict, recent violence, historic animosity, weakness of claimant groups (to control potential break-outs • Identify/consider conflict 'warning signs'. Communities can make a list of warning signs that would be evidence of increasing border tensions within or between communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PIU at the ORCU • Contracted firms • Public security Personnel • Private security personnel • woreda peace and security bureau
Hiding/encampment of armed groups in forest/plantation areas, robbery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced Information and Communication platforms between Woreda program implementation unit and local public security forces • Increased coordination and information sharing on potential security risks from armed groups locomoting in the area with other trusted public security actors • Thorough risk assessment and contextual analysis, in addition to routine measures, (Counter-terrorist search, hostile surveillance and reconnaissance detection and convey escort/protection if applicable),necessary for detecting armed groups presence in the area • Suspension of program activities in forest areas, presence of armed groups is detected within 50km radius of program area. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • Local and regional officials • Local and regional security officials • Contracted firms • Program security focal person
Burning assets/crop fields from wild-fire in the forests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improving, agricultural fields burring practice of local farmers, including training to local framers on wild fire management techniques. • Establishment of strong wild-fire barriers- land breaks/gorges between plantation areas and agricultural fields • Establish/strengthen fire-control plan and fire-control arrangement of program operation areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU in collaboration with worreda Agri bureau • Contracted firms • local/worreda fire-fighting barged
Historically or politically rooted Inter-ethnic conflicts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure PCO recruits, equips, and trains security forces consistent with Program SMP • Conducting socio-economic conflict analysis to understand the root cause of border conflicts in program implementation areas. • Map out' individuals, organizations and strategies that could resolve border conflict • Early identification and management of conflict Intensifying factors: ethnic conflict, recent violence, historic animosity, weakness of claimant groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • PCO • Public Security Officials and Army Commands • Local Political Officials

Security Risks Identified	Proposed Mitigation Measures	Responsible Body
Program area land demarcation induced disputes or conflicts b/n cooperatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strictly apply the Program RF, RP and LRP • Reliance and strengthen of local conflict resolution institutions and endogenous practices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • Worreda Land bureau • Local elders
Insecure road and access blockage due to armed conflict between insurgents and government forces affecting program operation, insecure road	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhanced Information and Communication platforms between Worreda program implementation unit and local public security forces • Increased coordination and information sharing on potential security risks from armed groups locomoting in the area with other trusted public security actors • Thorough risk assessment and contextual analysis, in addition to routine measures, necessary for detecting armed groups presence in the area • Suspension of program activities in forest areas, presence of armed clash is detected within 50km radius of program area. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • Contracted firms • Public Security Officials • Army Commands • Political Officials
Wild animals' attacks on humans and crops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of physical security/fences especially to nearby forest with high wild-animals population • Perimeter fencing of buffer zones between agricultural fields and village near by forests • Promoting plantation of edible fruits or plants eaten by wild animals so that consumption pressures on human crops agricultural fields gets minimized • Interventions for controlling the reproduction patterns of selected wild animals • Using natural repellents as optional strategies for keeping away wild animals from farms or crops, for e.g. Chili peppers; the chemical on it, Capsaicin is an excellent repellent against elephants, monkeys, squirrels, farmers who plant chili peppers will also benefit from extra source of income. • The borrower will create awareness to farmers to grow chilis and peppers to safeguard their plantation from crop-eating elephants as a better alternative in terms of efficiency and safety than using shooting guns in the air to scare and repel elephants. • This innovative use of chili plants and peppers, a non-lethal method of repelling elephants, not only reduces human-wildlife conflict, but it also creates goodwill for conservation efforts in the region. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PCO and its Security Personnel • Local police • worda agriculture bureau • agriculture bureau
Conflict between local villagers and forest-cooperatives over access to natural resource	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish agreed up on binding agreement that specifies patterns of permitted and non-permitted utilization of natural resources in the forest • Understand and mitigate the underlying cause's competition/conflicts. Address security risks with a social solution (e.g. reduce community members' trespassing to gain access to pasture source by providing a direct route to pasture or firewood source or by providing a new pasture source 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • Contracted firms • Political Officials

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that community members have access to program grievance mechanism. 	
Workplace injuries/safety risks, including road safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strictly apply the program LMP; purchase and supply of PPE materials; enforce the workplace safety features as per the OHS plan. • Awareness raising training on work-place safety cultures, including road safety • Establishment of first-aid corner or mobile first-aid boxes • Basic first-Aid training to program workers and Forest management cooperatives members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • Contracted firms
More common security risks, petty theft from nursery-sites, looting of program materials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site access control: guidelines for security personnel on how to interact with community members seeking access to Program site or raising a concern (for example, training on the grievance mechanism and Code of Conduct). • Use of physical security personnel. • premises fencing especially materials areas, storage areas like seed/nursery sites • Establish formal and consistent reporting and communications mechanisms with local police and other security related stakeholders. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Woreda OFLP-ER program coordinator • program Security focal person/coordinator • Local police
Security-posed GBV Risks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strictly adhere to the provisions set out in the Program GBV Action Plan developed as part of the ESMF. • Awareness-raising/training for security personnel (both private and public) on GBV. • Awareness-raising training for women and local community members • Grievances that deal with gender-related allegations must be handled very carefully, with respect for the confidentiality of the complainants, survivors and their families. • working together, referrals and collaboration with Women and social affairs bureau 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • Contracted firms • Public/government Security officials • Worreda Women and Social Affairs bureau

<i>Security Risks Identified</i>	<i>Proposed Mitigation Measures</i>	<i>Responsible Body</i>
Program Service-induced conflicts especially after ER-payment release/discharge	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strictly adhere to the provisions set in Program Benefit sharing plan • Accessible and repeated community members consultations composing both program participant ,non-participant community members and local administration representatives • Establish and strengthen locally accessible program grievance redressing/ handling mechanism. • Designing a program membership arrangement that permits new membership opportunities vis-à-vis with certain commitment requirement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • Program social safeguard coordinators • Worreda/local administration n bureau
Impacts from deployment of public or private security personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effecting Contractual arrangements with all involved security guards hence provide clear instructions on expected code of conduct. • Induction training to recruited security personnel, covering topics like, proportionate use of force, what constitutes sexual harassment, GBV, and program's asset management system • Documented disclosure of program's policy on firearm holding, utilization and disciplinary measures for breaches on code of conduct • Establish accessible means of receiving and reporting incidents and allegations regarding misconducts by security personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORCU • Contacted private security company

Section Six: Program Security Management Plan

This section of the document describes the Security Management Plan (SMP) of the OFLP-ER program. This document is intended to be a live, working document for the duration of the program implementation. It will be regularly reviewed and its content, narrative and procedures shall be updated to reflect changes or updates to be noted throughout the contract time.

The document describes how OEPA/ORCU and relevant woreda sector bureaus will manage anticipated security risks to program employees, the community, properties of contractors as well as program affected communities. This SMP document will be utilized and implemented in accordance to Ethiopian Government security practice and specifies any additional or different application of controls, specifically required to the nature of contractor's services to OEPA/ORCU and security nature of program implementation area.

6.1 Scope and Purpose of the current Security Management Plan

This security management plan document defines the content and structure of OFLP-ER program security management plan. It also addresses the requirements for staff, operation processes, documentation, technology and physical facilities needed to meet the specific physical and personnel security, governance and assurance requirements of the World Bank. The SMP also specifies and document how these additional requirements are to be added to the ORCU environmental, social and occupational safety management activities. Furthermore, this SMP intends to address all the workforces, assets and program affected community's security within all program implementation areas. The main purposes of this Security Management Plan (SMP) are to:

- Define scope and boundaries of the OFLP-ER Program Security Management System;
- Document commitment by OEPA/ORCU management to a fit-for-purpose of the program security management system;
- Document roles and responsibilities within OEPA/ORCU for overall program security management system;
- Identify and describe the major elements governing the implementation and operations of the Strengthen;
- Program security management system that is required for compliance against World Bank Environmental and Social Standards (ESSs).

Therefore, in upcoming phases of OFLP-ER program operation, OEPA/ORCU shall:

- Document and keep this SMP and update it during Program implementation;
- Evaluate the actual effectiveness of security risk mitigation options or post incident actions
- Ensure that the prioritized security risks and impacts are taken into consideration in establishing, implementing this security management plan (SMP); and
- Evaluate the effectiveness of security risk prevention and mitigation measures quarterly.

6.2 Program security management arrangements

Before discussion and analysis of proposed security management arrangements, it would be better if we examine existing program security arrangements followed by the borrower or OEPA in program implementation areas. Current security assessment of OFLP-ER program implementation areas shows that, so far in program implementation areas, there exist three modalities of security management arrangements.

A) Conventional/customary community based security arrangement

Findings from the field based security risks assessment and OFLP-ER program implementation areas shows that the most common kind of existing security arrangement is a beneficiary community oriented, conventional security management arrangement. By this modality, members of forest management cooperatives or PFM participants themselves establish members based rotational security warding, usually composed of 2-3 warding individuals who will be guarding a designated forest/plantation area for certain agreed period. This security responsibility will keeps rotating to all cooperative members every 2-3 weeks period.

B) Contracted Individuals Security Personnel

Another kinds of security arrangement that rarely existing in some of OFLP-ER forest/plantation areas is, employment of individual security guard often from local community, who will be contracted to ward certain-sensitive Program facilities or program activity entities like nursery sites in our case. By this arrangement program coordination unit/ORCU or relevant government sector bureau will vet/hire individual security guards to get his/her security service as having salary or wage return expectations from the employee.

C) Physical Security

The third kind of observed program security management arrangement is Physical security system. With this modality certain security aspects may be solved just through physical security system including security barriers, such as fences, gates, locks, and guard posts, and By the time of field assessment, the consultant has also managed to see physical security assessment arrangements aiming to protect some facilities like, water reservoirs, nursery sites, and equipment/tools warehouse, however, the use of such physical security measures may also be perceived by the program affected communities as the threat to their day-to-day life or being perceived as sign of distrust.

Based on the above background contexts and depending on the level of OFLP-ER program security risks analysis, the following security arrangements are suggested in upcoming program undertakings. The security arrangement can engage both private and public/government security personnel who might be engaged by the program contractor or by the Borrower (OEPA/ORCU). The program security arrangement may involve the use of; (i) customary or community based security, (ii) privately contracted individual guards, (iii) physical security and rarely (iv) public or

government security, who may also be assigned on demanding contexts to provide extra-support to the local communities where the program activity operation exists, but it is suggested that they do not be involved in protecting specific program activities on a regular basis.

6.3 Checklists for Managing Program Security Arrangements

The section below reminds important precautions/checklists to be followed by the implementing entity (OEPA/ORCU) is planning or performing program security arrangement activities.

- ***Oversight and strengthening of customary/community based security***

Consideration of existing community based or cooperative member based security arrangement is vital. Yet, it does not mean that it is a total outsourcing of security responsibility to forest management cooperatives. The program implementing agency OEPA/ORCU or any other involved program contractor shall still need to strength and leverage those customary security management arrangements.

The ORCU or any future program contractor's shall leverage and oversight the behavior and manner of security guards assigned by forest management cooperatives. Moreover, while the local cooperatives have their own security management systems or restriction outcomes, ORCU should still have to perform its formal oversight or practice-leverage responsibilities.

- ***Vetting and Hiring Procedures***

The requirement in the OFLP-ER SMP set out that “Who” provides security service is as relevant as *how* security is provided. Thus, the provisions in the program expect ORCU or any Program Contractor to “make reasonable inquiries to ensure that those hired to provide security are not implicated in past abuses.”

In view of this provision, ORCU or Program Contractor should not knowingly employ or use any individuals or private security companies that have history of abuse or human right violations. Reasonable efforts should also be made to review employment records and other available records, including any criminal records. Moreover, expectations regarding conduct and use of force should be communicated as terms of employment and reiterated through regular training.

- ***Contractual Agreement***

Program contractor's relationship with private security for its need should be managed through a formal process. For security personnel who are program contractor's staff, this should be through an employment contract and internal contractor organization's policies and procedures. For external ORCU—as with any contractor—should make its performance expectations explicit in the form of a detailed contract agreement with any program contractor in need of the private security services.

It is recommended that the contract agreement include standards of performance for security tasks and expectations of conduct as well as provisions to terminate a provider's services if

the standards are not met. The following key performance indicators could be considered as part of performance standard;

- Organizational policy on ethical standards and human rights.
- Having written policies on conduct and use of force.
- Always Nonviolent means before resorting to force and firearms.
- pre-employment screening and induction training for all guards and supervisors
- Sufficient logistics and Equipment.

For more on this please see Annex 2 which provides template Contract with a Private Security Provider Company.

- **Training of security guards**

The Program should use (whether hired by ORCU or Program Contractor) only professional security guards who have some training and continue to be adequately trained. all contracted private security company shall be a member of ICoCA or at least shall abide by ICoCA's code of conduct, (<https://icoca.ch/the-code/>). Particularly when individual guards are being recruited from the local community, they should be trained on the use of force (including less lethal weapons and, where applicable, firearms) and appropriate conduct (typically focused on reinforcing respectful behavior) toward workers and program affected communities, often illustrated through examples and/or scenarios.

Use-of-force training includes less lethal weapons as well as training on firearms in situations where guards are armed. Training programs can be provided by ORCU, Program Contractor Organization, and/or qualified third parties. When training is designed and delivered by contractors, ORCU/program security focal person should periodically review the training agenda, materials, attendance log, and other aspects of the training.

- ***Code of Conduct (for more information on this please see annex 3)***

ORCU and Program Contractor should require the appropriate conduct of the private security personnel they employ or engage. They should have a clear Code of Conduct policy, and security personnel should have clear instructions on the objectives of their work and permissible actions, based on good international practice and applicable national law and WB's ESSs. It can also be very helpful for security personnel to be aware of how to access ORCU and or Program Contractor's grievance mechanism and register a complaint, as they are often the first point of contact for visitors (including community members) to program implementation site.

- ***Use of Proportional Force***

individual security guards should operate under a specific policy on the use of force, often outlined in a guard's employment contract and/or scope of work (for directly employed security personnel from local communities) or enumerated as a standalone set of protocols and/ or included within the Security Management Plan and private security providers' policies (for contracted security personnel). Guards should be clear on how to respond and appropriately use available tools (for example, weapons or other measures) in addressing a threat.

The policy should specify that force will not be sanctioned “except when used for preventive and defensive purposes in proportion to the nature and extent of the threat.” Appropriate use of force should be included in the security training program. When possession of firearms is necessary, any weapons issued, including firearms and ammunition, should be licensed according to national laws, recorded, stored securely, marked, and disposed of appropriately.

In addition to procedures for storage and disposal, the security provider should have procedures for issuing weapons and safeguarding them while in a guard’s possession. ORCU and Program Contractors are advised to review these procedures and periodically request records for weapons issuance. Any private security personnel authorized to carry a firearm should be appropriately trained in its use.

- ***Equipping***

All security guards should be provided with the appropriate equipment to undertake their responsibilities. This equipment typically includes a proper uniform with appropriate identification, radio or other communications device, and any other equipment determined as necessary by the Security Risk Assessment/required by the Security Management Plan. Where security guards are armed, OEPA/ORCU and Program Contractors are counseled to request legal permit evidence for staff to carry firearms.

- ***Decision to Arm***

The decision whether to arm security guards is an important one. Usually, guards should be armed only when the assessment of security risks shows that a threat exists; one that can be addressed only by arming guards, thus equipping them to protect human life. The default position should be *not* to have armed individual security guards, unless risk analysis shows this to be necessary and appropriate. Depending on the type of weapon and the level of training, arming private security personnel can sometimes increase rather than decrease risk.

If the ORCU or any Program Contractor prefers/decides to use armed private security, the good practice procedures shall be implemented and security guards shall be armed as follows:

- In defined and very particular roles;
- With the appropriate weapon for the level of risk;
- With the requisite training on use of firearms and clear rules for the use of force; and
- Equipped nonlethal methods of protection to apply before resorting to use of lethal force.

- ***Incident Reporting and Inquiry***

The applicable national and WB legal formwork for OFLP-ER program requires OEPA/ORCU or any program activity contractor to “consider and, where appropriate, investigate all allegations of unlawful or abusive acts of security personnel, take action (or urge appropriate parties to take action) to prevent recurrence, and report unlawful and abusive acts to public authorities.”

This begins with having policies and procedures to accept and assess information about security incidents, allegations and use-of-force incidents of any kind. It is good practice for ORCU to be able to: 1) accepts security-related reports or complaints; 2) gather and document relevant information; 3) assess the available information; 4) protect the identity of alleged victim and those reporting the allegation or incident; and 5) report unlawful acts to regional state authorities.

- ***Monitoring***

It is also good practice for ORCU and its Contractors (as part of their oversight responsibilities,) to monitor program operation-level performance of their security guards or security personnel on an ongoing basis to ensure professional and appropriate conduct. There could be also a monitoring or audit practice by external consultants who can perform semi-annual monitoring on operational performance of security personnel.

This may include reviewing policies and materials, undertaking periodic audits, potentially assisting with, or supporting training, and considering any allegations of unlawful or abusive acts by security personnel. Speaking to employees and local community members who come into regular contact with program security staff can also provide valuable insights. ORCU is advised to consider sanctions, when necessary (like holding payment or termination).

6.4 Managing Public or Government Security engagement

As previously stated in section 6.2 above in certain demanding instances Government/public security personnel might be deployed to provide security services to program operation activities or program workers. Depending on prevailing level of security risks, typology of public security options in Ethiopia may range from the use of local militia, local police force to extent of engaging national defense army.

Public security forces involvement in OFLP-ER program site shall only be encouraged on special demanding circumstances and they should not be involved in protecting specific program activities on a regular basis. The involvement of public security shall only be considered only for typically broader-community context level instabilities or fragile security conditions. Because of this, public security forces involvement in OFLP-ER program sites could typically be driven by:

- The request of the OEPA/ORCU, due to a perceived increase in the security threat level, for example, in program areas with instable, fragile and conflict situation; risk of attacks from armed insurgents, instances of road closure by ethnic/border conflicts
- Oromia regional state demand or put as a requirement. Generally, the program related security issues are encouraged to rely first on program-owned or contracted individual security forces to solve site security problems, not think of public security forces as a priority or as a replacement for contracted security forces. But, if this option fails, the GoE or the regional government may require deploying public security.

- Option of working with public security forces can be the most challenging aspect of security management for ORCU, as it do not control the decisions of public security personnel or may have limited influence in this regard. For this reason, the engagement of public security in OFLP-ER program should take the following key management-considerations.

Signing a Memorandum of Understanding

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) is a formal, written agreement between the ORCU and concerned woreda/regional government authorities and commanding unit of the local/regional/federal security forces. The MoU should establish and document agreed key expectations and decision-making processes and procedures with regard the engagement of public security personnel. It allows ORCU, local government and public security forces to delineate their respective roles,

There are many ways to construct the MoU. In general, it is recommended that: (a) the MoU include references to program SMP, national laws, WB's ESSs and other applicable international laws such as relevant UN protocols; (b) the MoU typically includes any financial or resourcing issues (such as housing, food, stipends, transportation, and the like); and (c) where possible, it is recommended that ORCU includes a provision allowing them to request the removal of individual public security personnel from their area of operations. Moreover, it also recommended that the MoU will contain rules on the use of force, detail project code of conduct and any other appropriate program specific training requirements such as GBV prevention or training on what constitute SEAH.

Communication and engagement with public security

OEPA/ORCU is advised to communicate their principles of conduct to public security forces and express their desire that the security provided be consistent with those standards. The degree and formality of this communication may vary according to the security risks and the nature (and appropriateness) of the security arrangements involving public security personnel. ORCU should keep a record of any communication or communication attempts with public security personnel. It shall also develop or establish a functional activity/incidence reporting mechanism for other relevant stakeholders.

Low-risk contexts: If the number, type, and nature of the deployment appears appropriate and proportional to the assessed risks, ORCU may wish, at a minimum, to simply maintain contact and communication through check-ins with public security forces to help the program be confident that police will respond quickly and professionally if an incident occurs, or that suspects (including community members) caught trespassing or stealing will be treated fairly in police custody.

High-risk contexts: In high-risk contexts, having a more formalized and established relationship can be central to ensuring that any potentially tense and dynamic situations do not escalate to become even more volatile due to police or military involvement. The situation can be exacerbated if the risk of excessive force by public security personnel seems high.

Proper handover: When public security is needed to protect program workers and property, there should be a proper handover of control from contracted/private employed security guards to public security and a way to manage handing the control back when the situation is stabilized. This can be a good topic to start a discussion, because it focuses on public security’s legitimate role and on assuring the greatest effectiveness and safety.

Section Seven: Security Management-Plan Supervision and Governance

7.1 Responsibility of Ethiopian Forest Development (EFD)

- Ethiopian Forest Development (EFD) will oversee the overall technical and policy dimensions of the program at the Federal level including the implementation of security management plan with collaboration of the OEPA.
- EFD, while taking their fiduciary, technical support and oversight responsibilities, should adhere to program security cross-coordination responsibilities with MoF and OEPA.




Figure 7.1: Organizational responsibility chart for the implementation of security management plan.

7.2 Security Management Steering Committee

Security management steering committee composed of project team leader from EFD, from consultant, Project manager from contractor, representative from Ministry of peace; representative from regional peace and security bureau, federal police commission, ministry of defense, regional police commission will be established to follow up the security issues along the road corridor.

Other security bodies listed in the chart will be communicated by the security management steering committee and information will be exchanged for the successful security safeguarding of the OFLP program implementation activities.

7.3 The Responsibilities of OEPA/ORCU

- The ORCU through its woreda PIU (coordinator) and implementing entities at woreda level is responsible for the overall supervision and cross-functional coordination of the daily performance of the program security activities and security personnel. The same management structure will also be responsible for security information sharing and communication.
- In program areas where decision is made to engage security personnel and safeguard workers, sites, assets, activities, and communities, the ORCU is responsible to assess the risks to and impacts on human safety/security rising from the engagement of such personnel.
- The ORCU is also responsible to supervise whether contracted firms or Organizations manage the private security personnel they hire in compliance with the provisions of the national laws, WB's ESSs, program SMP, and relevant international good practice.
- ORCU will also be responsible for reporting any allegation/incidents of security personnel to the appropriate government authorities and facilitate the proper legal process.
- ORCU is responsible for the communication of principles of conduct and encouragement of public security forces to implement good practices and to disclose security arrangements

7.4 The Responsibilities of the program Contracted Organization (PCO)

Outsourcing security to Private Security Provider Company (PSPC) does not mean outsource the PCO's responsibility for managing the contracted organization or PSC; through regular audits, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), contractor meetings and field missions. While the security company has its own management hierarchy, contractor has a formal responsibility for managing the private security personnel it hires. Furthermore, the PSC should be responsible for day-to-day management of its personnel and security management activities. PCO has leverage and oversight the behavior of its private security personnel in compliance with the organizational police and code of conduct.

- Contractors shall assure assessment of the risks and implementation of good practice in hiring, training, and employment of private security forces.
- PCO is responsible for reporting any allegation of security personnel under its control to appropriate government authorities and shall cooperate in due process of the legal action.

- Periodically, SRA is important to identify potential risks and to advise appropriate risk management plan. It is the responsibility of the contractor to assess security risks along the OFLP intervention areas and submit to EFD.
- It is the responsibility of the contractor for recording and reporting of the incident in relation to the ERPA project as soon as the incident occurs. Incidents related to death shall be reported within 24 hours to the EFD and the World Bank.

7.5 The Responsibilities of the Public Security forces and Political Officials

- Public security forces are typically outside ORCU direct control and degree of influence is insignificant. Thus, members of public security officials (Local/Regional Political Officials, Local Militia Head, woreda Police Commander, Commander-in-Chief of the regional army/Oromia special force) are responsible to supervise whether the public security personnel are performing their duties in compliance with the national laws, provisions in the program SMP and other relevant international conventions.
- Public security and political officials are also responsible to assess and disclose in advance to ORCU the risk from public security forces deployment in program area (if any)
- Assessing and consider reporting of allegations or Incidents related to public security personnel and initiate due legal process and investigation for proper corrective measures.

7.6 Cross-Functional Coordination

Across all security management process, besides those that are describe above, cross Functional Coordination engagement is needed. The input and responsibilities of several stakeholders, such as program site manager, program security-coordinator, Ethiopian forest development, local community representatives, representative of women, program human resource head, the court system and many others shall have to be incorporated to create synergy. . The security management steering committee will lead the overall task and there will be a quarterly based meeting among various actors at higher level. The security risk management stakeholders who are found at Woreda level will meet on monthly bases.

7.5 Security Operating Procedures

The upcoming paragraphs provide a brief description of key security operating procedures OFLP-ER program security management plan will draws to follow. The implementation of the SMP is guided by the following key procedures.

A. Standard operating procedures

- ***Incident Response or when to engage:*** Early engagement with public security forces before incidents arise is key consideration. It is always advisable to build capital in a relationship before stressing it with problems. Initial meetings, weekly or bi-weekly are best used to identify appropriate counterparts, develop rapport, and facilitate access.
Once dependable relationship is established, the full range of issues, both positive and negative, can be regularly discussed in a cordial and diplomatic manner. This includes both the

ORCU's needs and the security forces' logistical needs. These meetings also offer an opportunity for ongoing/ updated assessment of security risk and threat analysis.

- **Decision tree model:** The Program security management shall adopt a structured approach using the collaborative approach for all the armed security operatives in prioritizing the collection of relevant and timely data during incident response. The structured tree model approach helps to define how questions are answered allows the incident response team to respond consistently with predictable results. The structured approach also provides for definable, reproducible structures to be created facilitating controlled cost exposure during an incident response cycle.
- **Boundary Security:** Security arrangements will maintain control of program perimeter by deploying responsible personnel at strategic points along boundaries of selected program facilities. It also channel people to access-control points that will have security personnel (both armed and unarmed as well as those in uniform and non-uniformed personnel on areas identified with high risk level, site specific security assessment should be conducted and immediate action needs to be taken to avoid or mitigate the risk. This shall be conducted from 3-6 months of the project effectiveness.
- **Access-Point Operations:** This key procedure describes on the types of checks and screening for both people and vehicles at gates or other access points for the Program. The access point procedure for OFLP-ER program is that access to selected sites/facilities will by authorized assigned personnel. Visitors to Program sites also fill a visitor form with providing all his/her details and purpose of the visit. A badge will then be processed and issued by the Access control office. Security induction must be done before the Badge is issued to the applicant by Security officer and the visitor must sign on the induction document for acknowledgement.
- **Vehicle Access Control Procedures:** All Vehicles accessing Program facilities will be accessed through with the driver only after going through a security check/search for prohibited items i.e. Firearms, flammable-items, alcohol Beverages, Knives or dangerous drugs. The driver must declare his entire luggage at the main gate for checking. Furthermore, a vehicle booking in/out form shall be maintained in order to access it.
- **Information and Communication:** Specify procedures for categorizing, handling, and controlling sensitive security information. Limit the sharing of information to that which is legally authorized and impose appropriate conditions on use where a continuing obligation to ensure the confidentiality of the information. Assure that information, which is shared with federal organizations, state and local governments, and the private sector, is appropriately protected comparable to the protection provided when the information is within the system.
- **Materials Storage and Control:** If applicable, describe any controls over the transport, inventory, and maintenance of storage areas for raw materials, equipment, etc. Note that these are stored in accordance with appropriate national laws and regulations and relevant good international industry practice, including the World Bank Group Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines. It is essential to develop a structure risk and material controls processes and take into account the technical and financial capacity of different entities involved so they can

provide effective material storage and control related support. The KPIs should adequacy of risk mitigation plans, including the timely identification and escalation of better material storage sites and control mechanisms.

- **Firearms Security:** Program policy regarding firearms on site, as well as responsibilities and procedures for issuing and storing any security firearms, ammunition, and non-lethal weapons. This should include location for storage; how weapons are properly secured during storage; records for issuance; who they may be issued to; safeguarding while in possession of the personnel; and audits. A menu of risk management options should be developed to include armed security personnel, starting with the lowest number and lowest calibre of approved firearms possible and gradually increasing until the needs of the system designed to protect the ERPA system are achieved. To provide these two functions, armed security personnel must be properly trained, equipped (including with the appropriate firearms), supervised and integrated into the wider security system.
- **Special Situations:** There may be instances where large-scale events (e.g. civil disobedience, mob crowd, demonstrations, civil disorder or workers strike), which require interventions by public security that is not specifically associated with the program. When planning for such events or emergencies, there should be clarity on how program security (private/individual guards) passes/ handover control to formal public security (for example, regional special force, police, military, emergency responders). In order to handle such conditions, special training in close collaboration with the government peace and security system is vital. Collaboration should include gender-related security issues and special circumstances of PAPs, staffs and overall program implementation process. It also involves preparing special arrangements, agreed on an inter-agency basis, for handling special situations. This will involve also collaborative and or leveraging with the existing projects being implemented within the project area.
- **Firefighting:** Physical security arrangement enabling each program site to have firefighting plan including necessary resources. Zonal Environment safeguard experts in collaboration with Environmental safeguard experts in ORCU will develop the firefighting plan.
- **Medical:** In the case of a medical emergency, such as sickness or work-place injury, affecting program staff, safety-kit corners shall be established. Risk assessment findings in all study woredas shows no medical evacuation plan so far. Basic first-aid training for use during medical situations at workplace. Injured people shall also be immediately evacuated to the nearest medical facility capable of delivering the appropriate life-saving care. For any job-related accidents or injuries at work places, there shall be a medical insurance coverage to all workers by the program. Hence all program operation sites need to Establish effective Medical Evacuation Plan.
- **PPE setup:** Most relevant safety tools (such as hand gloves, safety shoes and sun-hat) utilization protocol shall be established to mitigate workplace accidents/ risks identified by security risk assessment. ORCU in collaboration with woreda Agriculture bureau shall also provide induction training on PPE utilization and safety procedures. In the case of forest

workers or PFM participant sick or injured because of program activities (for example, is injured at Program nursery location) then it is the responsibility of the Program to support the individual in obtaining the appropriate assistance. All staff, contracted partners and volunteers, while engaging in program activities (MUST wear adequate PPE at all program site based plantations or when engaging on demanding activities. Forest management cooperatives members must also be encouraged to wear PPEs when participating in program activities.

B. Critical Security Incidents

Critical security incidents are any incidents which may have a critical impact on OFLP-ER program personnel, assets, activities, or reputation. They may involve or affect any of the personnel covered in this plan, and might include but are not limited to:

- Kidnapping or abduction
- Shooting or armed attacks
- Fatal road traffic accident or Motor-bicycle accidents
- Arrest or detention of Program personnel.
- Loss of life as a result of Program activities.
- wildfire broke out in OFLP-program areas
- Medical emergency affecting program personnel.
- Reputational crisis related to program personnel or activities.
- Cases or allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse.

***Establishment of Crisis management team**

For those critical security incidences, each program implementation area will establish a crisis management team mainly composed of woreda program coordinators, zone level program's environment and social safeguard coordinators, program's vehicle drivers, forest management cooperatives representatives and officers from local kebele administration. The membership size of the crisis management team could range between 8-12 persons as determined by existing contexts. This team will oversee each incidents related the program. To manage these activities, the CMT shall develop a separate Crisis Management Plan and the team shall be supported with training and guideline on how to deal the likely crises.

Suspension of Activities, Hibernation, and Relocation

In the event of a critical security incident, or a significant deterioration in the security environment, it may be necessary to take significant steps in order to safeguard the wellbeing of personnel and prevent (further) harm or damage. Program security focal together with regional program coordinator shall liaise with the regional security organs on the prevailing security situation /provide security briefings and advisories to all program staffs, as well as movement restrictions for areas witnessing or of imminent armed conflict.

Suspension of Activities

- Should the security situation deteriorate in a specific location, it may be necessary to pause or postpone planned Program activities until the threat has passed.

- The main reason for the suspension of the program shall be communicated with the PAPs. In additions to that, the timeline for program suspension and the likely probability of resuming the activities shall be indicated to the PAPs. If there is no forecasted change in circumstances, then a suspension based on an assessment of the situation may be required.
- In extreme cases, a suspension of the entire Program may be in order.
- The authority to suspend activities: rests with the regional program coordinator in consultation with woreda level program coordinators and the national security authorities and the WB TTL

Hibernation

- Hibernation or shelter in place refers to personnel seeking refuge in a safe location and not leaving that location until the danger has passed. This time can range from a matter of Hours to weeks depending on the situation, and hibernation may take place at people's homes, at offices, or a designated safe haven designated area.
- In case of the deterioration of the security situation in a certain area, the authority to order hibernation rests with the regional program coordinator and must be approved by Oromia Environment protection Authority management team//regional office for EFD.
- Locations with a relatively better security safety and access to basic services shall be considered for hibernation purpose.

Relocation

- In some cases, withdrawing from the area may be necessary, for instance if there are no Locations deemed safe enough to spend prolonged periods of time, or if failure to relocate at a given time would mean a lack of options to leave later on.
- The program security coordinator should draft and prepare a relocation plan for sites located in the hazardous areas. The authority to order a relocation of program personnel rests on the regional program coordinator and in consultation with management team of OEPA and the national Security authorities.
- In all of the above cases, it is vital to carefully assess any return to normal functioning. There is a danger either of returning to operations prematurely, and before the security threat has passed or adequate mitigation measures put in place, or not returning to operations at all due to concerns of irresponsible exposure to risks. Both of these dangers are solved through thorough assessment of progress on security threats and mitigation measures, as well as honest risk vs. benefit analysis.. These activities need to be conducted with all key stakeholders. Authority to resume activities and/or redeploy staff resides in ORCU unit of OEPA.

Section Eight: Grievance Redress Mechanism

8.1 Security-related GRM policies and procedures

It is good practice and part of sound risk management for ORCU to have clear organizational policies and procedures for handling security-related allegations or incidents. The grievance

mechanism required under OFLP-ER program SMP provides an important avenue for workers, forestry-cooperative members, program affected communities, and other stakeholders to address concerns about security activities or personnel within the client's control or influence.

ORCU is encouraged to have systems in place to receive and respond to allegations or incidents. This includes a grievance mechanism and relevant reporting and inquiry protocols, as follows:

- ***Establish a grievance mechanism to receive security-related concerns or complaints:*** It is important to have a structured and accessible process for receiving and responding to security-related complaints and to ensure that affected community members are aware of it. In general, concerns may come from a wide range of sources including communicated directly to Community Relations staff, kebele level-compliant handling committee, through a hotline telephone number, via tip boxes outside the program site, and suggestion boxes placed at sector bureau which are being involved in program implementation.
- ***Clarify reporting requirements and structure:*** good procedures normally specify which type of security-related allegations and incidents should be reported, to whom, and in what time frame. Complaint handling Procedures should clearly identify both the person(s) responsible for accepting and processing allegations or incidents, and escalation hierarchy to management.
- ***Develop inquiry protocols:*** In addition to a routine process for recording all incidents, more serious incidents or allegations related to security personnel conduct may require a more in-depth inquiry to determine whether policies and procedures were strictly followed and if any corrective, disciplinary, or preventive actions are warranted.

8.2 Key Steps in Security-Related GRM Process

Every allegation or incident related to security should be assessed, regardless of whether in a low-risk or high-risk context. The level of depth and detail of inquiry should flow from the seriousness of the allegation or incident. The steps involving the GRM process are further discussed as follows.

Step One: Record the incident or allegation: All incidents and allegations should be recorded, whether they come from an incident report, the grievance mechanism, or any other formal or informal means of communication. Serious allegations and incidents should be reported to senior management within the same day acts committed. Potentially criminal wrongdoing such as theft, rape/attempt of rape, carjacking, GBV, fire break-out should be reported to the relevant authorities within 24 hours. ***Annex 4*** provides Sample Incident Report Summary Template.

Step Two: Collect information promptly: Information should be collected as early as possible following an incident or receipt of an allegation. This may include noting details related to the circumstance, individuals involved, location, timing, and so forth, and taking statements and/ or photographs where relevant.

Step Three: Protect confidentiality: ORCU is advised to consider confidentiality measures to protect alleged victims, witnesses, and/or complainants—for example, identifying them by numbers instead of names. Victims, witnesses, complainants, and other interviewees should be informed as to whether and how their identities will be protected and whether their names will be recorded and/or used.

Step Four: Assess the allegation or incident and conduct further inquiry, if warranted: After receiving and recording an allegation or incident report, ORCU typically assess the seriousness and credibility of the claim against existing security policies and procedures to determine any noncompliance by security personnel and whether further investigation is needed.

A more in-depth inquiry should be conducted in cases of serious allegations or incidents, such as instances of unlawful or abusive acts by security personnel, and/or where severe impacts result from a security incident, such as injury, sexual violence, use of lethal force, or fatalities. Behavior that may be considered criminal should be referred to the relevant authorities.

Step Five: Document the process: The allegation or incident and the inquiry process should be documented, including sources of information, evidence, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. Where it is not possible to reach a conclusion (for example, due to limited or contradictory information or evidence), the efforts being made should be stated clearly along with any efforts to fill gaps and make further assessment. It is good practice for information related to security allegations or incidents to be classified and handled as confidential. Any report should be objective, impartial, and fact-based.

Step Six: Report any unlawful act: Potentially criminal wrong doings or unlawful acts of any security personnel (whether employees, contractors, or public security forces) should be reported to the appropriate authorities (using judgment about reporting in cases where there are legitimate concerns about treatment of persons in custody). ORCU is advised to cooperate with criminal investigations and ensure that internal processes and inquiries do not interfere with government-led proceedings.

Step Seven: Take corrective action to prevent recurrence: Action should be taken to ensure that negative impacts are not repeated. This may entail corrective and/or disciplinary action to prevent or avoid recurrence if the incident was not handled according to instructions. In general, ORCU is encouraged to identify lessons learned from the incident and take the opportunity to revise internal company policies and practices as needed.

Step Eight: Monitor and communicate outcomes: Since ORCU or contracted organizations (PCO) are controlling their own internal processes, they could help ensuring consideration of any allegation or incident is professional and progresses at a reasonable pace. Additional oversight may be needed with regard to third-party inquiries, such as those undertaken by private security providers. ORCU and PCO are encouraged to actively monitor the status of any ongoing criminal investigations led by government authorities.

It is also good practice to communicate outcomes to complainants and other relevant parties, keeping in mind confidentiality provisions and the need to protect victims. Where appropriate, it can also be constructive to share relevant lessons learned and any efforts to incorporate these into company policy and/or practice.

Figure 8.1: Key Steps in the Security-Related GRM Process



8.3 Procedures to manage risks of sexual harassment from security personnel

Special gender considerations are so important in sexual exploitation and abuse related security risks, as women often have different experiences and interactions with security personnel. For example, the potential for sexual harassment or sexual violence against women can increase from an expanded presence of private or public security forces in a project area.

Thus, consulting women separately may offer important perspectives and may help companies identify a fuller range of potential risks and community concerns. At the same time, security personnel's awareness of and respect for culturally specific gender issues may help the local population accept their presence.

Before engaging to the security service provision, each of employed or contracted security guards or public security personnel deemed to be deployed in project area, shall take GBV related induction training and shall capture some awareness on what constitute a sexual harassment or abuse. Moreover he/she has also must be briefed, understand and sign program's sexual exploitation and abuse code of conduct, which will be part of the employment contract.

If gender-based violence or sexual exploitation and abuse allegations are egressed on public or private program security personnel or do issues arise from public report or are alleged during project implementation or supervision, ORCU project social safeguard expertise must be alerted immediately. Project gender expertise is also advised to consult the Bank's Good Practice Note and Project SMP on Recommendations for Addressing Gender-based Violence involving security personnel. Grievances that deal with gender-related allegations must be handled very carefully, with respect for the confidentiality of the complainants, survivors and their families.

Section Nine: Security Management Performance Monitoring

The Performance of program security management process should be monitored in an ongoing basis. Monitoring may use diverse methods including but not limited to the following ones.

9.1 Site Visits

The PIU in the ORCU should plan for and implement site visits to monitor Program security risks and arrangements. The frequency of the site visits may be determined as necessary, but annual visit is the minimum requirement. To track program security performance, site visit will use different modalities of collecting information including:

- ***Schedule meetings with key personnel:*** As part of scheduling meetings and the required Security Briefings, ensure that relevant site management personnel are included to be able to provide and discuss security-related information, including: (a) Worreda program coordinators, Program/Site Manager, worreda/cluster safeguard focal persons (who has overall responsibility for program risks); (b) Security coordinators, Protection Manager (or person responsible for security); (c) Community Relations Manager; (d) civil societies and private actors and (e) Human Resources Manager, Environment and Safety Manager.
- ***Request assistance in arranging meetings with external stakeholders, including, as appropriate:*** (a) Public Security representatives, where possible and appropriate (e.g., local senior police officer, local militia, regional special force military commander, etc.), (b) Local public authorities (head of woreda administration, woreda peace and security officers; etc.); (c) Municipal authorities; and (d) Local community members: Seek information on community members' concerns, where possible. If the topic of security personnel may be raised, it is good practice to not have security personnel present during meetings with community members or civil society, even if this means that a meeting location needs to be switched to a more neutral location; (e) Reiterate the commitment to the Code of Conduct and grievance mechanisms
- ***Observations on site:*** Site visits provide the opportunity for many useful observations about security status, while arriving at and moving around the site. There should be an advance briefing about the program activities, sites, and security issues that may help focus questions and observations.
- The above means of collecting on-site information for monitoring security management involve asking questions of many different stakeholders. This can help gain new information as well as confirm previously collected information or insights. Site-visit questions during program implementation should aim to assess understanding of the essential elements of the security arrangement prepared for a specific Bank program (e.g. any codes of conduct, training content, protocol of security responses, reporting procedure), what security response has been to past incidents, and issues in implementing the security arrangement/security management plan.

9.2 Oversight

Oromia Environment protection Authority/ORCU and any Contracted Organization, as part of their oversight responsibilities, should monitor site performance of their security personnel on an ongoing basis to ensure professional and appropriate conduct. This may include reviewing policies and materials, undertaking periodic audits, potentially assisting with or supporting training, and considering any allegations of unlawful or abusive acts by security personnel. Speaking to program employees and local community members who come into regular contact with security staff can also provide valuable insights to monitoring the performance of program security management.

9.3 Joint Implementation Supervision Mission (JISM)

The SMP should be reviewed during supervision missions by the program implementing entities and the development partners. Depending on the assessment of program security performance, appropriate corrective actions may be proposed. As part of program supervision, the World Bank staff review incident reports submitted to the Bank, and grievance mechanism logs regarding grievances or allegations that involve program-related security personnel.

Security-related allegations or incidents can include issues such as theft, abuse of power and retaliation, sexual harassment and exploitation, gender-based violence, and bribery and corruption. Bank staff should request more information about any reported incidents and steps taken to address the issue and prevent recurrence and should promptly keep Bank management informed of allegations or instances of violence or abuse and the remedial efforts. Allegations or incidents related to security personnel should be documented and assessed with the objective of determining compliance or noncompliance with policies and procedures and whether any corrective or preventive actions are required.

If gender-based violence or sexual exploitation and abuse issues arise or are alleged during program implementation or supervision, Bank Management must be alerted immediately. Bank staffs are advised to consult the Bank's Good Practice Note on Recommendations for Addressing Gender-based Violence and shall also discuss the issue with specialized social development staff. Grievances that deal with gender-related allegations must be handled very carefully, with respect for the confidentiality of the complainants, survivors and their families.

9.4 Independent Security Audit

The Security management plan should be reviewed during supervision missions by the Bank. Depending on the assessment of the program security performance, an independent security audit may be proposed for basic corrective measures. Besides, significant changes in the program's security situation should be reported immediately to the Bank. Depending on the nature and severity of security impacts, an independent security audit may be undertaken which will allow for the necessary changes/updates to the SMP or ESCP.

At this initial stage of the program, an independent security audit timeline is suggested to be every six-month period of program operation, which then could be scheduled annually for later stage of program operation. Where incidents or grievances regarding security have been identified, the risk profile of the program may need to be changed, and Bank's supervision may need to increase, such as more frequent monitoring trips or the use of third-party monitoring.

9.5 Communicating the Outcome of Complaints

Program staff responsible for program SEP and Grievance Mechanism should communicate outcomes to complainants and other relevant parties, keeping in mind confidentiality provisions and the need to protect victims from further incidents or retaliation. Where appropriate, it can also be constructive to share relevant lessons learned with the community and any changes made to prevent future incidents.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Security Risk Assessment Data Collection Tools

**Short description on the tools and purpose of the data collection (must read this initially before the commencement of actual interview/ FGD sessions).* This KII tool or FGD guide is prepared mainly to gather relevant data on community security risk conditions of OFLP-ER program workers and overall program beneficiary communities on your area/kebele or worreda. Data collected from this KII or FGD is aiming to only inform the security risk assessment of OFLP program or program activities. Assessment team members will keep Information gathered strictly confidential, hence your volunteer participation on interview/FGD sessions as well as genuine answers are greatly appreciated.

A. Key Informant interview guiding Questions for program staffs: (for program coordinators or site level program supervisors).

1. How you describe the general potential for conflict and around the program area (probe about escalation of violence/security-risk from regional armed insurgents, endemic political, social, or labor unrest)? General local community attitude toward the program?
2. Do you think the program is ever been exposed to targeted pressure from local/regional political establishments? If so could you please explain more on this...?
3. What do you think are most common types of program related security risks; program-specific risks to the community members? (Probe, risks emanating from nature of program activities, PFM, A/R GBV, robbery while moving in forest, road and transport-travel from home to program site, etc.)
4. How you describe general incidence/conditions of unethical behaviors by program workers like; Employee theft, destruction of program assets or facilities, GBV or labour unrest?
5. Are there securities personnel are already deployed in program area..? if yes do they have Written contracts/ MOU, mentioning code of conduct, proportional force utilization), if No/, who is currently providing security service to facilities/program site?.
6. What kind of recruitment or vetting process was undertaken prior to employment of program security forces? (Do they have/planned to have same cultural background to the area, language/ religion? are there women security personnel so far?
7. Are security personnel armed? If so, what security risk assessment was done to come to that decision and under what conditions can force be used?
8. So far in program implementation how did security incidences were being handled, is that by program-security personnel or local police or by any other sources...?

B. Key Informant interview guiding Questions for local Admin and sector bureau heads: (kebele managers and relevant sector bureau heads). (Agriculture bureau, Land bureau, women and children affairs bureau, peace and security, cooperative agency)

1. How you describe the general potential for conflict/violence in your area or community (probe about escalation of violence/security-risk from regional armed insurgents, endemic political, social, or labor unrest)? General local community attitude toward the program (OFLP-ER)?
2. Do you think OFLP-ER or program activities have ever been exposed to targeted pressure from local/regional political establishments? If so, could you please explain more on this?
3. What do you think are the most common security risks or factors of vulnerability to community members in your area/kebele in their everyday life (disaggregated by sex, age or economic stand, since risks might vary to men, women, children, youth, and the poor, urban/rural)?
4. What are the front line public-security actors in your area, to whom you are reporting incidents of community security/safety issues are occurred (crime, theft, road-accident, GBV or when conflicts between armed groups, whom report is made)..?
5. What do you think are most common types of program related security risks; program-specific risks to the community members? (Probe, risks emanating from nature of program activities, PFM, A/R GBV, robbery while moving in forest, road and transport-travel from home to program site, etc.)

C. Key Informant interview guiding Questions for program Security staff: (shall be handled separately, with no presence of program mgrs. or coordinators)?

*Security incidents can occur when the security personnel themselves do not feel secure.

1. Overall working context: duties, wages, length of shift, food rations, duration of employment,
2. Supervision and reporting: who their manager is, where they would report/ if escalate incidents are happening?
3. Basic scenario-based questions: - What would they do first if someone forced their way onto the property?
4. What would they do if someone stole something and was running away?
5. What type of interaction(s) do they typically have with community members, if any?
6. What is a typical day on the job like?

7. What is a typical work schedule? (e.g., how many shifts per day/week?)
8. What is the duration of day and night shifts?

*D. FGD guiding Questions for local community members/program beneficiaries: (Better if we mix those who participate in OFLP program and just community dwellers), *separate male and female FGD sessions might also be needed based on local cultural contexts*

1. Have you heard or experienced any problems or incidents associated with the program? (Keep open-ended and note if any issues regarding security are raised. Does not specifically focus on security; proceed to other grievance management issues? What about risks to program assets?)
2. What do you think are the most common security risks or factors of vulnerability to community members in your area/kebele in their everyday life (disaggregated by sex, age or economic stand, since risks might vary to men, women, children, the poor and youth? might be applicable to other vulnerable groups if any?)
3. What do you think are most common types of program (OFLP) related security risks; program specific risks to the community members? (Disaggregated by sex, age or economic stand)?
4. To whom would you report a security and safety risk related problem/incident or crime?
5. What do you want to see being changed in your community in relation to security or community safety issues? (What about changes in security risk issues or safety conditions regarding women, children, the poor or other vulnerable groups of the community)?

E. Direct observation Checklist, for Field-level participant observations (shall only be used by senior researchers/not by proxy-data collectors)

1. **Security provisions on site, Such as**

- ✓ Visible security presence in and around the site;
- ✓ Are there any women security personnel?
- ✓ In case of the use of armed security, is their uniform different from other uniformed program personnel or other formal public security uniforms common in the area?

2. **Professionalism of security guards, for example:**

- ✓ Proper uniforms, clean cut;

- ✓ ID with prominent photo and name;
- ✓ Basic stance, posture, demeanor
- ✓ What communications equipment are on their person and otherwise available?
- ✓ Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC): Is there an established medical evacuation procedure
- ✓ Are there secured storage areas/facilities for weapons not in use?

3. Access points and signage:

- ✓ Are there clear signs about protocols (including safety messages)?
- ✓ Is the name of the program and contact information prominent at access points
- ✓ Are there procedures in place to ensure people are not bringing weapons or other prohibited materials (e.g., alcohol, drugs) or unauthorized persons on site?
- ✓ Is emergency contact information listed if someone needs to report an incident or emergency?

4. *Observations off site:* Observations outside the site, for example travelling from nearest worreda town to the program site or just walk-in within local community; This will help to grasp important picture of the security landscape:

- ✓ Public security: quality and presence in the worreda town Vs local/remote areas;
- ✓ Local community activities: - Behavior of and towards women and children;
- ✓ Local commerce (e.g. market activity, market days and participants);
- ✓ Public routines and curfews
- ✓ Local daily life Vs Current reality (i.e. finds out what is usual, and assess whether what is observed conforms to that description given by other KII sessions).

Annex 2: Template Contract with a Private Security Provider Company

This template is designed for ORCU or its Program Contractor seeking to hire an external private security provider. The parts in blue italics should be completed by the company, based on the particular context. As with any template, the content should be reviewed and adapted for the specific situation.

ORCU or Program Contractor Organization's Name hereinafter referred to as "employer" enters into this contract with Private Security Provider Company's (PSPC's) Name hereinafter referred to as "contractor" for the provision of services effective as of Date.

- **CONDUCT**

- Contractor and its employees must adhere to the company's policies for *ethical standards and human rights*.
- Contractor and its employees must maintain confidentiality of sensitive information.
- Contractor and its employees must not use torture, cruelty, or inhumane treatment.
- Contractor and its employees must ensure the health of those in custody and provide medical assistance when needed.
- Contractor and its employees must not engage in corrupt practices.
- Contractor must treat its employees in accordance with national law, WB's ESSs and SMP of the DRIVE program.

- **USE OF FORCE**

Restraint and caution must be exercised consistent with international guidelines on the use of force; in particular, the Basic Principles on Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and including the following key elements:

- Use of force should be evaluated, *and use of weapons carefully controlled*.
- Nonviolent means should be used before resorting to force *and firearms*.
- When force must be used to protect human life, it should be proportionate to the threat and should seek to minimize injury.
- Medical assistance should be provided as soon as safely possible.

- **POLICY**

Contractor is required to have or produce key internal policies that commit the organization to proper standards, to ensure that its employees understand and adhere to the standards, and to enforce them. This includes:

- Having written policies on conduct and use of force.
- Having a policy to perform pre-employment screening for all supervisors, guards, consultants, security specialists, and other staff, which identifies any history of abuse or wrongdoing. At a minimum, these checks should include police records and criminal litigation checks, as well as checks with former employers.

- Having a policy on reporting and inquiry into allegations of unlawful or abusive behavior and all use-of-force incidents, followed by appropriate disciplinary action.
[Note: although the contractor should be required to conduct an inquiry when its people are involved, ultimate responsibility remains with the employer.]

- **TRAINING**

- **Weapons Training**

(This includes firearms, if issued, and any nonlethal weapons systems, if used.)

- Each security guard must be certified as qualified for use of any weapon, *by pass/fail standard*, before being issued a weapon.
- Qualification should recur *every six months*.

- **Use-of-Force Training**

This should include:

- Use-of-force technique training and practice through structured, scenario-based, performance-oriented (learning-by-doing) training.
- Where, in what circumstances, and under what conditions it is lawful and in accordance with employer policy to use force of any kind.
- The maximum level of force authorized.
- Emphasis that any use of force must be a last resort and proportionate and appropriate to the threat.
- Emphasis that lethal force can only be used if there is an imminent threat to life or of great bodily harm.

- **Appropriate Conduct**

Training should emphasize avoidance of unlawful or abusive behavior. This training should clearly define abusive behavior in relation to proper behavior and point out sanctions; it should also inform trainees of national laws and international standards on human rights that the employer—and they as employees of the contractor—must observe. Two important documents include:

- UN Basic Principles on Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
- UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials.

- **Equipment**

Contractor must ensure that all employees are provided with the appropriate equipment to undertake their responsibilities. This equipment includes *a proper uniform with appropriate identification, radio or other communication device, and any other equipment as determined by the Security Risk Assessment or Security Management Plan as being required*.

- **Auditing**

The employer reserves the right to conduct periodic audits of the security provider to:

- Ensure contractor's background-check process.
- Audit and review contractor employee background checks.
- Review the provider's personnel records for all of the guards and security staff it provides.
- Audit incident/allegation responses.

The employer further reserves the right to conduct both scheduled and unannounced reviews and audits of the training program and observation of training events. This may include:

- Reviewing the provider's training program to confirm that the training is scheduled and being conducted.
- Reviewing lesson plans to make sure they meet the proper standard.
- Confirming the qualifications of the instructor(s).
- Ensuring that there is a *pass/fail* performance test to verify that the student mastered the material.
- Reviewing the certification process to guarantee that all the security personnel assigned to the company attended the training and have passed a minimum standard.

- **Sanctions**

- The company will apply sanctions, including but not limited to withholding payment for services, if the contractor does not meet the performance expectations outlined in this contract.
- The employer will terminate the contract where there are multiple failures to meet expectations or there is evidence of unlawful or abusive behavior by the contractor's employees

SIGNATURES OF ORCU

DATE

SIGNATURES OF PRIVATE SECURITY PROVIDER COMPANY

DATE

Annex 3: Sample Code of conduct for private security personnel

A. General preamble

As Security Guards his/her fundamental duty is to protect lives and properties and maintain order within my place of duty; protect the interest of my employer and our clients and the security and stability of our working environment and community without compromise and prejudice, honest in my actions, words and thoughts; and do my best to uphold the principles of this code of conduct.

B. Objective of the code

- To promote and foster amongst persons involved in the security industry responsible for guarding another person's property the highest standards of efficiency, service, equipment and ethical behavior.
- To give an undertaking to the general public that the regulation of security officers is in accordance with the principles of public health and safety.
- To set general standards for service and quality of employees operating in the sector of the industry, standard described in this code is the minimum standard

C. Professional standards and code of conduct

- To accept responsibilities and obligations of my role as a licensed security officer.
- To endeavor to shield persons or property from those who would cause harm and to do so with attentive observation and reporting to law enforcement while on duty.
- To conduct myself with honesty and integrity and to adhere to the highest professional principles in the performance of my duties as a licensed security officer.
- To be faithful, diligent and dependable in discharging my duties and to uphold at all times the laws, policies and procedures that protect the rights of others.
- To observe the precepts of truth, accuracy, and prudence, without allowing personal feelings, prejudices, animosities, or friendships to influence my judgment.
- To report to my supervisors, without hesitation, any violation of the law or of my employer's or client's regulations.
- To respect and endeavor to protect the confidential and privileged information of my employer or client beyond the term of my employment.
- To cooperate with all recognized and responsible law enforcement and government agencies in matters within their jurisdiction.
- To accept no compensation, commission, gratuity, or other advantage without the knowledge and consent of my employer.

- To conduct myself professionally and perform my duties in a manner that reflects credit.

D. Code of Ethics, statements on what To do and not to do's

- He/she shall carry with him at all times during his tour of duty his license, identification card and duty detail order with an authority to carry firearms
- He/she shall not use his license and other privileges if any, to the prejudice of the public, the program beneficiaries or customers and his agency.
- He shall not engage in any unnecessary conversation with anybody except in discharge of his duties or sit down unless required by the nature of his work and shall at all times keep himself alert during his tour of duty
- He shall refrain from reading newspapers, magazines, books, etc. while actually performing his duties.
- He shall not drink intoxicating liquor immediately before and during his tour of duty
- He shall know the location of the fire alarm box near his post and to sound the alarm in case of fire or disorder.
- He shall know to operate any fire extinguisher at his post.
- He shall know the location of the telephone and/or the telephone number of the police precincts as well as the telephone numbers of the fire stations in the locality.
- He shall immediately notify the police in case of any sign of disorder, strikes, riot, or any serious violation of the law.
- He or his group of guards, shall not participate or integrate any disorder, strike, riot, or any serious violations of the law
- He shall assist the police in the preservation and maintenance of peace and order and in the protection of life and property having in mind that the nature of his responsibilities is similar to that of the latter
- He shall familiarize himself by heart with the Private Security Agency Law (XXX. as amended) and these implementing rules and regulations
- When issued a firearm he should not lend his firearm to anybody.
- He shall always be in proper uniform and shall carry with him his basic requirements and equipment's such as writing notebook, pen, stick (baton) and/or radio.

- He shall endeavor at all times, to merit and be worthy of the trust and confidence of the agency he represents and the client he serves.

E. Declaration

Declaration			
I have read and understood the Code of Practice for Security Officers and understand that breaches of the Code of Practice will be addressed to the Director-General of Licensing for disciplinary action and that breaches of the <i>Summary Offences Act</i> or Criminal Code will be further framed under the provisions of those Acts.			
Declared at (Place)		On (Date)	
Signature of person making declaration		Date	
Full name			
Signature witness*		Date	
Full name of witness *			
*This Declaration may be made before any person who has attained the age of (18) eighteen years.			

Annex 4: Sample Incident Report Summary Template

Incident Report Summary	Reference #:
Month:	Year:
Incident type:	
Date and time of incident:	
Location of incident:	
Description of the incident (include situation leading up to the incident):	
Individuals involved (include contact details):	
Assessed consequences to the company and to community members (include a description of injuries or damage sustained, if applicable):	
Management actions:	
Prepared by:	Approved by:
Date:	Date:
Distribution:	

Annex 5: Picture of consultation with community members and woreda officials








Annex 6: Sample Consultation Sessions

FGD- Members Information from Gidde Abalo Kebele

No	Name	Responsibility (AIR/non-AIR members)	Contact Phone	Signature
1	Tasaye Kitiya Wegeri	non-AIR members	-	
2	Ayana Abena Tetate	AR members	0908983403	
3	Temini Wadajo Ayana	Non-AIR Members	0 -	
4	Tola Buli Dufera	non-AIR members	-	
5	Wegeri Duresa Ayana	non-AIR members	-	
6	Gemechu Kena'o Dinagde	non-AIR members	0928655254	
7	Boshera Megera Tolasa	non-AIR members	0935875525	
8	Megera Adugna Mulata	AR Members	0962220833	
9	Guotina Moti Fite	AR members	0922285021	
	/	/	/	/

Woreda level Interview Information (Guto Girda)

No	Name of Participant	Position	Phone No	Sign.
1	Warginaa Gammache	Co-operative	05-1740-3420	
2	Ayana Taddesa	Agri-office	05-1781-2304	
3	Elias Feyse	OFFER	05-1781-2004	
4	Dareje Takkale	"	05-1781-2042	
5	Kella Abate	Land use office	0935347630	

6. Amir Misan 0932230094
7. Abdi Milkii 0941002164
8. Fariid Alwel 0979368787
9. Xayib Nagsir 0917068315
10. Tofiq Al Jihad
11. Umar Tashome 0964982928
12. Yasiika Nizamu 0917751841
13. Amkaru Mahamad - 0992462567
14. Zauriya Mahamad - 0968061004
15. Zauru Misan - - -
16. Muska Al Badir - - -
17. Misira Garali - 09 - -
18. Feroza Masua - 0903461189
19. Fakiya Al Nuura - 0947187623

Minutes of the Discussion with Bore Dinsara Kebele Community (Agara Woreda) - Date Jun 9, 2022

Agenda - Lack of finance

- Governance

- Road issue.

1. Lack of Finance
The cooperative members raised that they have financial scarcity and require if would be additional financial support for their project activities.

2. Governance
majority of the participant were substantive that local administration has lack of good governance for their grievance. When issue related to project provide for their decision not promptly responded as issue demand.

3. Road Issue

Participants explain that the dwellers and project neighbors affecting the trees by crossing project site even though there is road access for local community to use. Some people leaving around the project site graze their cattle and using it a way the site.

Deliberation

The participant explained justified that they have full commitment of work and change themselves and their local if they get enough support in future issue raised in their agenda.

Annex 7: List of FGD/KII participants in current security risk assessment

A. Jimma Zone

No	Name of informant	Position	Woreda/Kebele	Contact detail	Date
1	Mustafa Ibrahim	REP Coordinator	Seka Chokorsa woreda officials	0919138251	08/06/2022
2	Gebire Fayisa	EFCC	Seka Chokorsa woreda officials	0917856937	08/06/2022
3	Ashenaf Haile	Agriculture Office	Seka Chokorsa woreda officials		08/06/2022
4	Zenu Abamacha	Kebele Administration	Shashemane Kebele	0917308217	08/06/2022
5	Tekele Ababulgu	Kebele official (security)	Shashemane Kebele	090550440	08/06/2022
6	Sabit Abafita		Shashemane Kebele		08/06/2022
7	Zebiba Abafita		Shashemane Kebele		08/06/2022
8	Mohamed Jemal	Member of Association	Shashemane kebele Community	0969479128	08/06/2022
9	Taha Ajehad	Member of Association	Shashemane kebele Community	0907488956	08/06/2022
10	Wude Adara	Member of Association	Shashemane kebele Community		08/06/2022
11	Jemal Abagaro	Member of Association	Shashemane kebele Community		08/06/2022
12	Mustefa Abamacha	Member of Association	Shashemane kebele Community		08/06/2022
13	Gali Abamacaha	Village Dweller	Shashemane kebele Community		08/06/2022
14	Ahmed Abagojam	Village Dweller	Shashemane kebele Community		08/06/2022
15	Takle Ababugu	Village Dweller	Shashemane kebele Community		08/06/2022
16	Wolde Faysia	Village Dweller	Shashemane kebele Community		08/06/2022
17	Abamacha Abagodu	Member of Association	Shashemane kebele Community		08/06/2022
18	Sitina Abatamam	Village Dweller	Shashemane kebele Community		08/06/2022
19	Zahara Ahmed	Member of Association	Buyu Kachama kebele community	0969479128	08/06/2022
20	Kezina Abazinab	Member of Association	Buyu Kachama kebele community	0925556934	08/06/2022
21	Abaneyim Abagojem	Villager Dweller	Buyu Kachama kebele community	0961892625	08/06/2022
22	Siraji Abagidi	Village Dweller	Buyu Kachama kebele community		08/06/2022
23	Ahmed Abawari	Member of Association	Buyu Kachama kebele community	0969479128	08/06/2022
24	Zenu Abatamam	Member of Association	Buyu Kachama kebele community		08/06/2022
25	Taju Abafita	Village Dweller	Buyu Kachama kebele community		08/06/2022
26	Abdise Tijani	Association leader	Bore Dinsa kebele	0942111868	09/06/2022

27	Hafiz Abbajabal	Association Assistant Leader	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0978028706	09/06/2022
28	Mahammedsali Abbakadir	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0903553362	09/06/2022
29	Kadir Aliyi	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0979044654	09/06/2022
30	Mahamedsani Abbbabiya	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0985921392	09/06/2022
31	Amir Mahamedsani	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0932230094	09/06/2022
32	Abdi Milki	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0941002164	09/06/2022
33	Farid Awol	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0979368787	09/06/2022
34	Tayib Nasari	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0917068315	09/06/2022
35	Tofik Abbajihad	Village Dweller	Bore Dinsa kebele Community		09/06/2022
36	Umar Tashome	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0964982928	09/06/2022
37	Yasiriba Nasizamu	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0917751841	09/06/2022
38	Ambaru Mahamed	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0992462567	09/06/2022
39	Zariya Mahmad	Member of Association	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0968061004	09/06/2022
41	Zara Mahamedsani	Village Dweller	Bore Dinsa kebele Community		09/06/2022
42	Miskiyya Abbakadir	Village Dweller	Bore Dinsa kebele Community		09/06/2022
43	Misira Gazali	Village Dweller	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0903461189	09/06/2022
44	Feruza Nasua	Village Dweller	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0903461189	09/06/2022
45	Fakiyya Abbanura	Village Dweller	Bore Dinsa kebele Community	0947187623	09/06/2022
46	Aziza Abafita	Kebele Manger	Bore Dinsa kebele Officials	0983492584	09/06/2022
47	Mohamed Zeneb	Kebele Security Officer	Bore Dinsa kebele Officials	0978028706	09/06/2022
48	Sadam Nuru	Cooperative	Bore Dinsa kebele Officials	0903553362	09/06/2022
49	Zakir Abatemam		Bore Dinsa kebele Officials		09/06/2022
50	Riyad Tahil	Member of Association	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0917554750	09/06/2022
51	Yasin Abatamam	Member of Association	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0917242516	09/06/2022
52	Abdulaziz Jamal	Member of Association	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0980375148	09/06/2022
53	Abdo Nasir	Member of Association	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0917207005	09/06/2022
54	Amadhusen Kamal	Member of Association	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0922490317	09/06/2022
55	Marzuf Nasir	Member of Association	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0941335246	09/06/2022
56	Ramadan Zakir	Member of Ass.	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0938049907	09/06/2022

57	Awol Abbatemam	Member of Association	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0917378972	09/06/2022
58	Nasiu Ababiya	Member of Association	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0941008088	09/06/2022
59	Fuami Abasambi	Village Dweller	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0991379113	09/06/2022
60	Sharif Abadura	Village Dweller	Ganji Ilbu kebele Community	0917068160	09/06/2022
61	Temam Abarago	Kebele Manger	Ganji Ilbu kebele officials	0910455091	09/06/2022
62	Swoge Fayisa	Kebele Administration	Ganji Ilbu kebele officials	0919109203	09/06/2022
63	Jamel Abagojem		Ganji Ilbu kebele officials		09/06/2022
64	Gazahegn Niguse	REDD+ Woreda Coordinator	Goma woreda officials	0917243228	09/06/2022
65	Adisu Wale	Land Administration	Goma woreda officials	0912161762	09/06/2022
66	Tahir Jamal	Process owner-EPA office	Goma woreda officials	0913146551	09/06/2022
67	Asrat Dalise	Process owner – EPA office	Goma woreda officials	0917747062	09/06/2022
68	Abdulsalam Kadir	Agriculture	Goma woreda officials	0917026455	09/06/2022

B. Buno Bedele Zone

No	Name of informant	Position	Woreda/Kebele	Contact detail	Date
1	Girmaye Fikadu	F/P REDD+ EPA	Bedele woreda officials	0913226060	10/06/2022
2	Girma Wakuma	Cooperative office	Bedele woreda officials	0917325341	10/06/2022
3	Wandimu Benti	Land Administration	Bedele woreda officials	0977332075	10/06/2022
4	Warku Magersa		Bedele woreda officials	0913975646	10/06/2022
5	Tesfaye Tucho	Member of Association	Odo Kebele Community	0979767150	11/06/2022
6	Tashome Dabela	Member of Association	Odo Kebele Community		11/06/2022
7	Ergu Tesfaye	Village Dweller	Odo Kebele Community		11/06/2022
8	Tamirat Kajela	Village Dweller	Odo Kebele Community		11/06/2022
9	Tigist Nega	Kebele Manager	Odo Kebele officials	0973820792	11/06/2022
10	Zerihun Kasehun	Kebele Security	Odo Kebele officials		11/06/2022
11	Fita Tolesa	DA	Odo Kebele officials		11/06/2022
12	Morisa Taye	Member of Association	Shane Badiro kebele community	0928483159	11/06/2022
13	Tafera Arfasa	Member of Association	Shane Badiro kebele community	0917544160	11/06/2022
14	Silashi Gabre	Member	Shane Badiro kebele	0917334650	11/06/2022
15	Alemu Danu	Village Dweller	Shane Badiro kebele community		11/06/2022
16	Fita Muluneh	Kebele Manger	Shane Badiro kebele officials	0917235477	10/06/2022
17	Tilahun Tessema	Kebele Leader	Shane Badiro kebele officials		10/06/2022
18	Bogale Chala	Kebele organizer	Shane Badiro kebele officials		10/06/2022
19	Jamal Abdulkadir		Shane Badiro kebele officials		10/06/2022
20	Daba Namomsa	F/P REDD	Chora Woreda officials	0913725216	10/06/2022
21	Jihad Shamsu	Land use	Chora Woreda officials	0920414904	10/06/2022
22	Beraket Indashaw	Cooperative	Chora Woreda officials	0917158633	10/06/2022
22	Ajibu Bushura		Chora Woreda officials	0913112774	10/06/2022

23	Endale Bezabi	Member of Association	Dabo Tobo officials	0917040937	11/06/2022
24	Adisu Bazabi	Member of Association	Dabo Tobo officials	0946514098	11/06/2022
25	Nasiru Manzumde	Member of Association	Dabo Tobo officials	0917159689	11/06/2022
26	Mangistu Mahamed	Member of Association	Dabo Tobo officials	0906226977	11/06/2022
27	Kalifa Mahamud	Member of Association	Dabo Tobo officials	0917098236	11/06/2022
28	Yeshi Dagine	Member of Association	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
29	Malkitu Tadase	Member of Association	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
30	Munaja Haimad	Member of Association	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
31	Mahamanur Tasfaye	Member of Association	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
32	Alemayew Bazabi	Village Dweller	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
33	Habtmu Yinasu	Village Dweller	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
34	Desalegn Eshetu	Village Dweller	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
35	Take Shibiru	Village Dweller	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
36	Rashidu Jemal	Village Dweller	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
37	Damisse Bazabi	Village Dweller	Dabo Tobo officials		11/06/2022
38	Shafi Assefa	Kebele Leader	Dabo Tobo Kebel officials	0917159972	11/06/2022
39	Nasir Fita	Kebele security officer	Dabo Tobo Kebel officials	0917211947	11/06/2022
40	Tesfaye Muluna	Kebele organizer	Dabo Tobo Kebel officials	0931596107	11/06/2022
41	Aminu Badiru	Development Agent	Dabo Tobo Kebel officials	0917270459	11/06/2022
42	Etensh Fikadu		Dabo Tobo Kebel officials		11/06/2022
43	Jabalu Ligdi	Member of Association	HawaYember Community	0921192342	11/06/2022
44	Busu Ligdi	Member of Association	HawaYember Community		11/06/2022
45	Lubea Ligdi	Member of Association	HawaYember Community		11/06/2022
46	Xaiba Wadajio	Member of Association	HawaYember Community		11/06/2022
47	Shuke Kadir	Village Dweller	HawaYember Community		11/06/2022
48	Amante Nagaho	Village Dweller	HawaYember Community		11/06/2022
49	Nasir Firsu	Village Dweller	HawaYember Community		11/06/2022
50	Shrafu Firisa	Kebele Leader	Hawsa Yember Kebele officials	0913735217	11/06/2022
51	Amade Nagaho	Kebele security officer	Hawsa Yember Kebele officials		11/06/2022
52	Shafi Ahimed	Abba Gadaa	Hawsa Yember Kebele officials		11/06/2022

C. South-west shoa zone

No	Name of informant	Position	Woreda/Kebele	Contact detail	Date
1	Tesfaye Geleta	RED+ Coordinator	Tumbe-achebe kebele	0913938654	15/06/2022
2	Lema Lelisa	WYDA-executive director	Tumbe-achebe kebele	0911879366	15/06/2022
3	Adisu mulugeta	Cooperative member	Tumbe-achebe kebele		15/06/2022

4	Terefe Abera	Cooperative member	Tumbe-achebe kebele		15/06/2022
5	Mosisa Gonfa	Cooperative member	Tumbe-achebe kebele		15/06/2022
6	Mulugeta Berhane	Cooperative member	Tumbe-achebe kebele		15/06/2022
7	Buzunesh Mulugeta	Cooperative member	Tumbe-achebe kebele		15/06/2022
8	Shelemma Gonifa	Kebele vice head	Tumbe-achebe kebele		15/06/2022
9	Tesfaye Geleta	RED+ south-west shoa Coordinator	Woliso woreda officials	0913938654	15/06/2022
10	Terefe Gutema	Woreda Env't protection bureau head	Woliso woreda officials		15/06/2022
11	Muluneh Hachalu	Land Administration bureau	Woliso woreda officials		15/06/2022
12	Abera Lechisa	Red+ technical committee member from worda Env't protection bureau	Woliso woreda officials		15/06/2022
13	Teshome Gurmesa	Woreda peace & security bureau	Woliso woreda officials		15/06/2022
14	Tesfu Bogale	Women & children bureau	Woliso worreda officials		15/06/2022
15	Abdi Shanko	Association Casher	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
16	Alemu Bifa	Member of association	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
17	Redewan Hussien	Member of association	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
18	Negash Hussien	Member of association	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
19	Amdu Getema	Member of association	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
20	Siraj Reshid	Chairperson of the association	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
21	Hadi Reshid	Member of association	Legay-kebele community	0916803243	16/06/2022
22	Mifta Ali	Village Dweller	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
23	Kedir Awel	Village Dweller	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
24	Selamu Gedefe	Village Dweller	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
25	Mustefa Shifa	Village Dweller	Legay-kebele community		16/06/2022
26	Geremew Asefa	Woreda Agriculture bureau head	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022
27	Asfaw Hirko	Env't protection expert	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022
28	Mulu Degu	Woreda BOLSA bureau head	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022
29	Melaku Endale	Env't protection bureau head	Seden-sodo woreda officials	0910871568	16/06/2022
30	Lema Negash	Peace & security bureau head	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022
31	Shelema Hangesa	Bio-diversity expert	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022
32	Rondesa Gelana	Woreda Water & energy bureau expert	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022
33	Bayisa Wondimu	Env't protection team lead	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022
34	Ayansa Jida	Environmental expert	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022

35	Buzayew Lemesa	Women & children bureau head	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022
36	Sisay Birhanu	M & E expert	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022
37	Comade Girma	Land administration bureau head	Seden-sodo woreda officials		16/06/2022

D. Wollega Zone

No	Name of informant	Position	Woreda/Kebele	Contact detail	Date
1	Emiru Temsgen	WEPA- Office Coordinator	Wayu Tuka woreda officials	0935741281	25/06/2022
2	Aster Kebede	WEPA- REDD+ focal person	Wayu Tuka woreda officials	0961841255	25/06/2022
3	Gidisa Mulatu	Agricultural Office	Wayu Tuka woreda officials	0925774520	25/06/2022
4	Habte Abera	Cooperative Agency	Wayu Tuka woreda officials	0935893979	25/06/2022
5	Dawit Temsgen	Kebele Manager	Gida Abalo kebele officials	0917099616	25/06/2022
6	Lalisa Bulti	DA	Gida Abalo kebele officials	0919860359	25/06/2022
7	Teshale Kemise	DA	Gida Abalo kebele officials	0945732532	25/06/2022
8	Ayana Abera	Member of Association	Gida Abalo kebele community	0908983403	25/06/2022
9	Negera Adugna	Member of Association	Gida Abalo kebele community	0962220833	25/06/2022
10	Gudina Moti	Member of Association	Gida Abalo kebele community	0921185021	25/06/2022
11	Tesfaye Kitila	Village Dweller	Gida Abalo kebele community		25/06/2022
12	Tamiru Wadajo	Village Dweller	Gida Abalo kebele community		25/06/2022
13	Tola Buli	Village Dweller	Gida Abalo kebele community		25/06/2022
14	Wagari Duresa	Village Dweller	Gida Abalo kebele community		25/06/2022
15	Gemachu Kenea	Village Dweller	Gida Abalo kebele community	0928655754	25/06/2022
16	Boshora Merga	Village Dweller	Gida Abalo kebele community	1915875525	25/06/2022
17	Warkneh Gemachu	Cooperative Agency	Guto Gida Officials	0917403420	25/06/2022
18	Ayana Tadesse	Agriculture Office	Guto Gida Officials	0917812304	25/06/2022
19	Elias Feyisa	OFFCA	Guto Gida Officials	0917817004	25/06/2022
20	Dereje Tekele	OFFCA	Guto Gida Officials	0917814542	25/06/2022
21	Reta Abate	Land use office	Guto Gida Officials	0939347630	25/06/2022
22	Mengistu Sirata	Member of Association	Jirenga kebele community	0927466232	25/06/2022
23	Yadesa Babo	Member of Association	Jirenga kebele community	0938331217	25/06/2022
24	Belay Sirata	Member of Association	Jirenga kebele community	0917136569	25/06/2022
25	Desalegn Adunya	Village Dweller	Jirenga kebele community	0920418346	25/06/2022
26	Tita Ibsa	Village Dweller	Jirenga kebele community	0917694554	25/06/2022
27	Takale Berhanu	Kebele security	Jirenga kebele officials	0927646446	25/06/2022
28	Tashome Tasissa	Kebele security	Jirenga kebele officials	096573919	25/06/2022
29	Almaz Hordofa	DA	Jirenga kebele officials	0917850898	25/06/2022
30	Dinkitu Dalasa	Cooperative	Jirenga kebele officials	0932112713	25/06/2022

E. West-Guji zone

No	Name of informant	Position	Woreda/Kebele	Contact detail	Date
1	Melke Gurmu	Bore Cluster OFLP Coordinator	Anowate kebele community	0910294360	17/06/2022
2	Dulo Galchu	Bore Woreda EPA process owners	Anowate kebele community		17/06/2022
3	Dawit Udo	Cooperative member	Anowate kebele community		17/06/2022
4	Nenko Sora	Cooperative member	Anowate kebele community		17/06/2022
5	Kenansa Bido	Cooperative member	Anowate kebele community		17/06/2022
6	Jarso Barako	Cooperative member	Anowate kebele community		17/06/2022
7	Biranu Areri	Cooperative member	Anowate kebele community		17/06/2022
8	Dasta Bido	Cooperative member	Anowate kebele community		17/06/2022
9	Dube Bido	Cooperative member	Anowate kebele community		17/06/2022
10	Guye Bire	Cooperative member	Anowate kebele community		17/06/2022
11	Tanacho Bido	CBO_memebers	Kilenso Babicho kebele community		17/06/2022
12	Gobana Bashido	CBO_memebers	Kilenso Babicho kebele community		17/06/2022
13	Asafa Badho	CBO_memebers	Kilenso Babicho kebele community		17/06/2022
14	Dabiru ganana	CBO_memebers	Kilenso Babicho kebele community		17/06/2022
15	Nenko Robe	CBO_memebers	Kilenso Babicho kebele community		17/06/2022
16	Melke Gurmu	OFLP_Bore Cluster woreda coordinator	Ard Jila Me'o Boko woreda officilass		14/06/2022
17	Robe Gobana	Environemntal protection Authority Head	Ard Jila Me'o Boko woreda officilass		14/06/2022
18	Markos Hayilu	Woreda Agriculture bureau head	Ard Jila Me'o Boko woreda officilass		14/06/2022
19	Adugna Gamada	Milisha Office Head	Ard Jila Me'o Boko woreda officilass		14/06/2022
20	Iliftusira Safoyi	Women and Children Affairs office Head	Ard Jila Me'o Boko woreda officilass		14/06/2022
21	Robe Ade	Peace & security bureau head	Ard Jila Me'o Boko woreda officilass		14/06/2022